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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
PlaintifCAppellee, 
V . 
THOMAS SMITH, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
CaseNo.20010817-CA 
Priority No. 2 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996), where the defendant in a district court criminal action may take an 
appeal to the Court of Appeals from a final order for anything other than a first degree or 
capital felony offense. In the underlying case related to this appeal, Appellant Thomas 
Smith was convicted of two counts of tax evasion for the year 1995. The counts were 
entered as separate second and third degree felony offenses, under Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1101(1 )(b) and (c) (1995). A copy of the judgment is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
The Issues Presented by Standby Counsel:1 
1 The trial court appointed Salt Lake Legal Defender Association ("LDA") to serve as 
standby counsel for Thomas Smith, while he represented himself in the criminal 
proceedings. (See infra, "Statement of the Case," herein.) LDA continues to represent 
Smith in that capacity. See State v. Bakalov. 1999 UT 45, ffl[15, 16, 979 P.2d 799 (an 
accused may defend him- or herself in criminal proceedings, including on appeal); Myers 
v. Johnson. 76 F.3d 1330,1333-34 (6th Cir. 1996) (recognizing a state criminal defen-
dant's constitutional right to present pro se briefs and motions on appeal); see also State 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to dismiss one of the counts in this case, 
where the two counts merged and constituted a single offense under the law. 
Standard of Review: The first issue concerns a question of statutory interpretation, 
which this Court will review for correctness according no deference to the trial court. 
See State v.Kepplen 1999 UT App 89, «f4, 976 P.2d 99 (citing State v. Brooks. 908 P.2d 
856, 859 (Utah 1995)); State v. Yanez. 2002 UT App 50,1J11,42 P.3d 1248 ("Whether 
two crimes merge is 'essentially an issue of statutory construction that we review for 
correctness, according no particular deference to the trial court'"). 
v. Rudolph. 970 P.2d 1221 (Utah 1998). In that capacity, LDA has raised two issues on 
appeal, which are identified as the issues and arguments of "Standby Counsel." Those 
matters have been raised pursuant to LDA's obligation "to be an active advocate in behalf 
[of] the client and [to] support the client's appeal to the best of its ability." See Order, 
dated April 24,2002, attached hereto as Addendum B (hereinafter "April 24 Order"). 
Inasmuch as Appellant Smith also "wishes to raise issues that LDA" may not raise, 
see April 24 Order, Smith has included his arguments in this brief. The matters presented 
by Smith are identified as the issue and arguments of the "Pro-Se Defendant." 
The manner in which LDA and Smith have proceeded with this brief in presenting 
Smith's pro se issue and arguments satisfies the April 24 Order, and allows this Court "to 
fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on appeal in the most effective and efficient for-
mat." See April 24 Order. "It also comports with sound and fair procedure" and the rules 
of procedure. See State v. Clavton. 639 P.2d 168,170 (Utah 1981); Utah R. App. P. 24. 
While this Court has made reference in its April 24 Order to the "Anders" doctrine 
as set forth in State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, and Anders v. California. 386 U.S. 738 
(1967), that doctrine is inapplicable here. According to the law, an Anders brief is 
appropriate in cases where appointed counsel has concluded "that an indigent client's 
criminal appeal is without merit." Clayton. 639 P.2d at 169; Anders. 386 U.S. at 744. 
Standby counsel in Smith's case has not reached such a conclusion. Standby 
counsel has not found the "case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious examination 
of it." Clayton. 639 P.2d at 169; Anders, 386 U.S. at 744. Standby counsel does not 
intend to seek "leave to withdraw from the appeal." And standby counsel does not intend 
to seek a dismissal of the appeal as set forth in the Anders doctrine. Indeed, standby 
counsel is raising issues on appeal for a determination on the merits. 
2 
2. Whether the trial court erred when it failed to instruct the jury on the defense of 
"good-faith," as set forth in Cheek v. United States. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a trial court's refusal to give a jury 
instruction for correctness, providing no deference to the trial court's ruling. State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 238 (Utah 1992). Also, in considering whether defendant was 
entitled to have the jury instructed on his defense, this Court will view the evidence and 
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence "in the light most favorable to the 
defense." State v. Crick, 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). 
The Issue Presented by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1, herein): 
3. Whether the convictions can be sustained on insufficient evidence. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews a sufficiency issue as follows: 
We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a matter of 
law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction. State v. Harman, 767 
P.2d 567, 568 (Utah App. 1989). Nevertheless, "the standard for reversal is high." 
Id. We will reverse only if the evidence is so "'inconclusive or inherently impro-
bable that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant committed the crime.1" Id (quoting State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443,444 
(Utah 1983)); accord State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985). We review 
from a perspective most favorable to the verdict the evidence and all inferences 
reasonably drawn from the evidence, recognizing that determinations regarding 
witness credibility are solely within the jury's province. Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. 
State v.Smith, 927 P.2d 649 (Utah App. 1996), cert denied, 937 P.2d 136 (Utah 1997). 
PRESERVATION OF ARGUMENTS 
The Issues Raised by Standby Counsel (see supra, note 1, herein): The first issue 
concerning application of the merger doctrine is preserved in the record on appeal at 595-
3 
602 and 936:509-530. The second issue concerning the "good-faith" instruction is 
preserved at 502 and 960:194-209. 
The Issue Raised by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1, herein). The suffi-
ciency issue raised by the prose defendant is preserved in the record at 936:427-33. 
RULES. STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following statutes will be determinative of the issues on appeal: Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 76-8-1101 (1995); 59-10-502 (2000); and 76-1-402 (1999). The text of those 
provisions is contained in the attached Addendum C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. Course of Proceedings. Disposition in the Court Below. 
On October 12, 1999, the state filed charges against Smith under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-8-1101 (1995) for two counts of tax evasion in 1995. (R. 1-2.)2 The trial court 
appointed LDA to represent Smith in the matter. (See R. 15.) During trial court pro-
ceedings, Smith filed numerous documents on his own behalf. (See i.e. R. 18-21; 28-69.) 
In September 2000, the trial court ruled that Smith could represent himself in the 
proceedings and it appointed LDA to serve as standby counsel to Smith in the case. (R. 
193-94; 214-283; 324; 408-412.) 
On April 9, 2001, the trial court commenced a jury trial in the matter. (R. 490-91; 
549-50; 553-54.) At the conclusion of the three-day trial, the jury found Smith guilty as 
2 Since the charges in this case relate to tax filings for 1995, all references to Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-8-1101 are to the 1995 version of the statute. 
4 
charged. (R. 589-92.) Thereafter, on September 7,2001, the trial judge sentenced 
Smith to indeterminate prison terms for the offenses, then suspended the prison terms and 
ordered Smith to serve probation for a period of 36 months. (R. 861-63.) Smith filed a 
Notice of Appeal (R. 888-89). He is challenging the rulings of the lower court as they 
relate to the trial proceedings. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The state charged Smith with tax crimes under Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c). 
At trial, the state presented evidence that Smith lived in a mobile home park in Sandy, 
Utah, in 1995. Smith worked from an office in his mobile home. He provided research 
services to citizens concerning the preparation of tax papers and filings. (See R. 934:67-
74; 935:129-30, 148, 151,183.) 
The state also called witnesses to testify from Zions Bank, the tax commission, and 
the Internal Revenue Service. Those witnesses presented the following evidence. 
The records custodian for Zions Bank testified that Smith and a partner signed 
bank signature cards for two separate trust accounts: The Citizens Legal Library Trust 
Account, and the Freedom of Information Act (F.O.I. A.) Trust Account. (R. 935:191-97, 
201,213.) In addition, Smith signed a bank signature card as custodian for the account of 
John Birrell. (R. 935:201.) The records custodian testified that deposits were made to the 
accounts in 1995 and checks were written against the accounts. (See R. 935:207.) 
Mericia Milligan, an auditor for the Utah State Tax Commission, testified that 
Smith failed to file a tax return for 1995. (R. 935:222; see also R. 935:337-38 (testimony 
5 
of Deloris Furniss).) She also testified that Smith filed returns in the 1970's and the 
1980fs. (R. 935:223.) Milligan described the relationship between federal and state tax 
filings, and she testified that according to the state tax commission, a Utah resident is 
required to file a state return if he is married, under the age of 65, filing jointly, and has 
earned at least $10,300 in income for the year. (See R. 935:241-43, 338-339.) 
Lori Campbell testified that she worked for the Internal Revenue Service in the 
criminal investigations division. (R. 935:248-49.) Based on her investigation of bank 
records relating to Smith, she determined that Smith received payment for services 
rendered in 1995 (R. 935:251, 262), and he paid for personal expenses from the Zions 
trust accounts. (R. 935:258.) Campbell testified that Smith did not file a federal tax 
return for the year 1995. (R. 935:259.) 
Dorothy Akins testified that she worked for the state tax commission as an inves-
tigator. (R. 935:275.) In that capacity, Akins researched records relating to Smith (id. at 
276), and determined that in 1995 Smith was running a research business from his home, 
he was paid for his services, and he deposited payments into either the F.O.I.A. Account, 
the Citizens Legal Library Account, or the account for John Birrell. (Id. at 278-79,282.) 
According to Akins, the deposits in 1995 to the three trust/bank; accounts totaled 
$66,862.58. (Id. at 289, 307.) Akins calculated deductions, and subtracted other amounts 
that could not be attributed to Smith, to arrive at an income for Smith for 1995 in the 
amount of $45,308.65. (IdL at 289-294.) Akins also reviewed bankruptcy documents 
filed by Smith, which reflected an income in 1995 of $10,500. (Id at 297-99.) Akins 
6 
testified that a person was required to file a tax return in 1995 if he was married, under 
the age of 65, and earned more than $10,300. (R. 935:282-85.) 
Next, Becky McKenzie testified. She worked in the auditing division of the Utah 
State Tax Commission. Based on her research, McKenzie determined that Smith's 
taxable income for 1995 was $45,308, and he owed $3,052.97 in taxes for that year. (R. 
936:351,365-66.) McKenzie testified that Smith did not pay taxes for 1995. She also 
testified that he was required to file a tax return. (R. 936:366-374.) 
After the state presented its evidence, Smith testified. He stated that from 1993 to 
1996 (R. 936:482) he read books and articles and amassed material to ascertain whether 
he was required to file a tax return. (R. 936:442,445.) Smith's books were admitted into 
evidence. (Id. at 452-53, Exhibit 23.) Smith also sought professional opinions and wrote 
to the Utah State Tax Commission to ask whether he was required by law to file a return. 
Smith testified that the tax commission did not respond to his inquiries. (R. 936:461-62.) 
Smith admitted that prior to 1995, he appeared before various tribunals to present 
his arguments on behalf of others, and in each instance, Smith's arguments were rejected. 
According to Smith, in 1994, he appeared before the Honorable Dee Benson in the United 
States District Court for the District of Utah and he presented arguments concerning tax 
filings. The judge rejected his arguments, compelling Smith to further educate himself on 
whether he was required to file a return. (R. 936:484-90, 507.) 
Smith testified that he continued his research and relied on his research in good 
faith. (R. 936:450.) Smith made his best efforts to educate himself on the subject of tax 
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returns, and he "honestly endeavored" to ascertain the law that required him to file. (R. 
936:475.) Smith testified that based on his good-faith efforts and studies, he was not able 
to find any provision that required him to file a return. (R. 936:450-51,467-75, 508.) 
Smith denied that his decision was "willful" in the criminal sense; rather, Smith's 
decision was willful in that it was an educated decision, supported by the literature he 
read. (R. 936:507.) Smith did not dispute that he last filed a return in 1987. (R. 936:505.) 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury convicted Smith as charged. Additional facts 
relating to the issues on appeal are set forth below. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Summary of the Arguments Raised by Standby Counsel (see supra, note 1, herein): 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 renders double convictions improper under the "merger" doc-
trine and the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine. In this case, Smith was charged with 
and convicted of two offenses for tax evasion in 1995 under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-
1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). Those subsections proscribe essentially the same conduct 
under the "merger" doctrine; and the conduct at issue supports a single-criminal episode. 
The trial court in this case erred when it allowed the double convictions to stand. Pur-
suant to § 76-1-402, the court should have vacated one of the convictions against Smith. 
Next, during trial, Smith requested that the trial judge instruct the jury on the good-
faith defense as set forth in Cheek v. U.S.. 498 U.S. 192 (1991). Pursuant to Cheek, the 
government must establish "willful" conduct to support a conviction for tax evasion. The 
Cheek Court defined "willful" as "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal 
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duty." Ld. at 200-01. The Cheek Court also ruled that if defendant presented evidence of 
a good-faith belief that he did not have to file a tax return, the evidence would support a 
valid defense. According to the Court in Cheek, the defendant is entitled to have the jury 
consider whether the evidence of good faith negates criminal willfulness. 
Smith presented evidence in this case to support a good-faith belief under Cheek. 
Smith was entitled to have his defense presented to the jury in an understandable way. 
That is, the jury should have been properly instructed on the matter. See Hamilton. 827 
P.2d at 238. In this case, the trial court rejected Smith's good-faith instruction. That was 
error. This case should be reversed and remanded for a new trial, in order that Smith may 
present his good-faith defense to the jury in an understandable way. 
Summary of the Argument Raised by the Pro-Se Defendant (see supra, note 1, 
herein): The evidence in this case was insufficient to support the convictions. Utah law 
provides that a person required to file a federal tax return must also file a state return. The 
state failed to present evidence in this case to support that Smith was required to file a 
federal tax return. Thus, the jury had an insufficient evidentiary basis to find that Smith 
was required to file a state return. The state failed to establish an element of each offense. 
On that basis, the convictions for tax evasion must be reversed. 
ARGUMENTS PRESENTED BY STANDBY COUNSEL3 
POINT I. A CONVICTION IN THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
VACATED UNDER SECTION 76-1-402, 
3 See supra, note 1, herein. 
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In the lower court, the state charged Smith with two counts of tax evasion for 
1995. Smith was convicted on both counts. The state charged the offenses under Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). The question in this case is whether the 
double convictions for tax evasion may be allowed to stand under the law. 
To decide that issue, this Court will look to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402. That 
provision states in relevant part the following: 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all separate 
offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the same act of a 
defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses which may be 
punished in different ways under different provisions of this code, the act shall be 
punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or conviction and sentence 
under any such provision bars a prosecution under any other such provision. 
* * * 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged 
but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included offense. An 
offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts required to 
establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of preparation to 
commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402 (1999); see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999); Utah 
Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V (double jeopardy provision). 
Section 76-1-402(1) defines the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine. Smith has 
referred to that doctrine by that name in the analysis below. See infra. Point I.A.2. 
Section 76-1-402(3) defines the "merger" doctrine. Smith has referred to that rule 
as either the "merger" doctrine or the "included-offense" doctrine. See infra. Point I.A.1. 
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The doctrines identified at Section 76-1-402(1) and (3) are separate, but related. 
Under the "merger" doctrine (subsection (3)), this Court will consider whether the 
two crimes at issue "are fsuch that the greater cannot be committed without necessarily 
having committed the lesser/" State v. Shaffer. 725 P.2d 1301, 1313 (Utah 1986) (quoting 
State v.Baker. 671 P.2d 152,156 (Utah 1983); Statev.HilL 674 P.2d 96, 97 (Utah 
1983)). That analysis requires the Court to look "to the statutory elements of the two 
crimes" at issue to determine if they merge. Yanez, 2002 UT App 50,f21. If the two 
crimes "stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses," defendant cannot be 
convicted of or punished for both. Hill 674 P.2d at 97. Here, the analysis supports 
merger. A conviction must be vacated as set forth at infra. Point LA. 1. 
Next, under the "single-criminal-episode" doctrine at subsection (1), the state may 
pursue only a single conviction against defendant when his conduct over a period of time 
constitutes a single act. That is,"embezzlement over a period of time may be found to 
constitute one continuous transaction." State v. KimbeL 620 P.2d 515, 518 (Utah 1980). 
Under that doctrine, the evidence in Smith's case supports a single criminal episode. A 
conviction must be vacated, as set forth at infra. Point I.A.2. 
A. BOTH THE "MERGER" DOCTRINE AND THE "SINGLE-CRIMINAL-
EPISODE" DOCTRINE APPLY HERE TO COMPEL THE ENTRY OF AN 
ORDER VACATING A CONVICTION. 
1. The Subsections at Issue Here Proscribe the Same Conduct. Supporting 
Application of the Merger Doctrine. 
In considering application of § 76-1-402(3), this Court will construe the plain 
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language of the criminal provisions at issue. HilL 674 P.2d at 97; State v. Redd, 1999 UT 
108, f 11, 992 P.2d 986 (statutes are construed according to their plain language; 
unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain 
meaning); see also State v. Burns. 2000 UT 56, T|25,4 P.3d 795 (this Court's "primary 
goal in interpreting statutes is to give effect to the legislative intent, as evidenced by the 
plain language"); Berube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd.. 771 P.2d 1033,1038 (Utah 1989) ("the 
best indication of legislative intent is the statute's plain language"). 
The criminal provisions at issue in this case are set forth at Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) (1995). Those subsections state the following: 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 or any 
lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, render, sign, or 
verify any return or to supply any information within the time required under this 
title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any false or fraudulent return or 
statement, or who supplies any false or fraudulent information, is guilty of a third 
degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less 
than $1,000 nor more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the payment 
thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty of a second degree 
felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than 
$1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (1995). 
The tax evasion offenses at issue here require proof of the same elements. 
Specifically, the plain language of subsection (l)(b) requires proof that the 
defendant (i) intended (ii) to evade any tax or lawful requirement (iii) by failing to make, 
render, sign, or verify a return or information; or by making a false or fraudulent return; 
or by supplying false or fraudulent information. Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101 (l)(b). 
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Subsection (l)(c) requires proof that defendant (i) willfully attempted (ii) to evade 
or defeat any tax or the payment thereof. It is logical that a willful attempted evasion 
under subsection (l)(c) occurs when a defendant fails to make a proper return; or verifies 
or supplies false information on a tax return as set forth in subsection (l)(b). See Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), (l)(c) (1995). In that regard, the provisions proscribe the 
same conduct. The separate elements for each offense are further discussed below. 
(a) The Separate Elements for Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c). 
(i) The mens rea element of each offense. 
The mens rea identified in subsection (l)(b) is "intent"; the mens rea identified in 
subsection (l)(c) is "willfully attempts." Under Utah law, "intent" and "willfully" are 
defined to mean the same thing: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with respect to the nature of his 
conduct or to a result of his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire to 
engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103 (1999) (emphasis added). Thus, the intentional/willfiil mens 
reas identified in subsections (l)(b) and(l)(c) are identical. 
Next, under Utah law the term "attempts" in subsection (l)(c) would support a 
classic "included-offense" relationship between the provisions. That is, an "included-
offense" exists if it "constitutes an attempf to commit a crime. Utah Code Ann. §76-1-
402(3)(b) (emphasis added). Under Utah law, "a person is guilty of an attempt to commit 
a crime if, acting with the kind of culpability otherwise required for the commission of 
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the offense, he engages in conduct constituting a substantial step toward commission of 
the offense." Utah Code Ann. §76-4-101(1) (1999); Utah Code § 76-4-302 (1999). 
The first element of each subsection supports merger under § 76-1-402(3). 
(ii) The second element of each offense: Defendant "evade [d]" a tax. 
The second element for each subsection requires the state to prove that defendant 
"evade[d]M a tax. Subsection (l)(b) makes it a crime "to evade any tax or requirement of 
Title 59 or any lawfiil requirement of the State Tax Commission"; and subsection (l)(c) 
makes it a crime "to evade or defeat any tax or the payment thereof." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-1101. Black's Law Dictionary defines the term "evasion," as follows: "Tax eva-
sion. The willful attempt to defeat or circumvent the tax law in order to illegally reduce 
one's tax liability." Black's Law Dictionary 1474 (7th ed. 1999) (emphasis added); see 
also Salem Citv v. Farnsworth. 753 P.2d 514, 515 (Utah App. 1988) (in constructing 
statutory terms, this Court will look to the dictionary to give the terms their "plain and 
ordinary meaning").4 Thus, to "evade" means to "defeat." Subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) 
4 When the Court construes a statute according to its "plain language" and defines terms 
in accordance with the dictionary, the Court ensures fundamental fairness in statutory 
interpretation and application. If the state could obtain a conviction based on its own 
creative interpretation of a statute, that would violate the due process provisions of the 
state and federal constitutions. See State v. Blowers, 717 P.2d 1321 (Utah 1986); U.S. 
Const, amend. XIV, § 1; Gravned v. Citv of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972) (laws 
that fail to clearly proscribe criminal conduct are vague, and they keep persons from 
knowing what is prohibited); see also Kolender v. Lawson. 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983). 
This Court will construe the criminal statute at issue to avoid any unconstitutional 
interpretation. 
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proscribe the same conduct. 
Next, both provisions make it unlawful to evade "any tax." Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1101(1 )(b) and (l)(c). Under subsection (l)(c), it is also unlawful to evade any "pay-
ment thereof; and under subsection (l)(b) it is unlawful to evade any "requirement of 
Title 59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission." 
Closer review of the terms identified above in subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c), 
reflects no real distinction in application. That is, subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to 
evade any "requirement of Title 59," which requires the payment of taxes. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-104 (1992 & 2000). Thus, subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to 
evade payment That language exists in subsection (l)(c). In the end, subsections (l)(b) 
and (l)(c) are identical, where they both proscribe the evasion of "any tax" or "payment." 
That supports merger. In addition, as further set forth below, both subsections apply in 
the same way to the facts of this case, without distinction. See infra. Point I.A.2. 
(Hi) Subsection (l)(b) describes the manner in which the flintent to evade" may be 
accomplished. 
Finally, Subsection (l)(b) includes language that does not appear in subsection 
(l)(c). It defines the circumstances that constitute an evasion, for example, where the 
person has failed "to make, render, sign or verify any return or to supply any information 
within the time required under this title," or where the person has supplied "false or 
fraudulent information." Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b). At first glance, the 
provision may appear to be distinguishable from subsection (l)(c). That is not the case. 
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Where subsection (l)(c) simply proscribes general tax evasion, subsection (l)(b) covers 
those situations where a person may accomplish such an evasion. 
Stated another way, subsection (l)(c) does not attempt to limit how a willful 
evasion may be accomplished. Consequently, its general language is as broad as 
subsection (l)(b), which identifies each situation where an evasion may occur. 
Consider the following: a person who fails to file an income tax return for the pur-
pose of evading payment (passive evasion) may be prosecuted under the plain language 
of either subsection (l)(b) or subsection (l)(c). Subsection (l)(b) makes it unlawful to 
evade a tax by failing to make, sign or render a return, or by failing to supply information; 
and subsection (l)(c) makes it unlawful to evade a tax or payment. Likewise, a person 
who "makes, renders, signs or verifies" a fraudulent/false return, or who provides 
false/fraudulent information to avoid a tax (affirmative evasion) may be charged under 
either provision, since both provisions penalize tax evasion. 
In reality, it is difficult to conceive of a situation where the state would be able to 
prove an "attempted willful evasion" under subsection (l)(c) without evidence that 
defendant failed to make, render, sign or verify a return; failed to supply information; or 
filed false/fraudulent information as set forth in subsection (l)(b). Thus, in the end, the 
subsections require the same proof for an attempted willful or intentional tax evasion.5 
5 Subsection (l)(c) also states that any person who evades a tax, is guilty of a second 
degree felony offense "in addition to other penalties provided by law" Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-1101(l)(c)(emphasis added). The emphasized language relates to civil "penalties" 
imposed under Title 59. See Utah Code Ann.§ 59-1-401 and id at -401(9) (2000) (iden-
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(b) The Utah Provisions Were Enacted to Conform to the Federal Provisions, 
Which Prohibit Double Convictions. 
The legislature intended the Utah tax laws to conform to the federal laws: 
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this chapter [individual income 
tax act] is to accomplish the following objectives: 
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or trust for each taxable year a tax 
measured by the amount of his "taxable income" for such year, as determined for 
federal income tax purposes, subject to certain adjustments; and 
* * * 
(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by reference, the provisions 
of the federal income tax laws which are applicable in arriving at the amount of 
income subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it is believed, will: 
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of persons required to file returns of 
income for both federal individual income tax and Utah individual income tax 
purposes; and 
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required Utah income tax return for any 
taxable year with a minimum expenditure of additional time and effort after having 
prepared his federal income tax return for such year; 
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the existing rules of procedure 
under and for the administration of the Utah individual income tax law to 
corresponding or apposite rules of administration and procedure prescribed by the 
federal income tax laws, with a view to reduction of duplication of effort, 
promotion of better understanding of requirements, and greater consistency 
between state and federal procedures and administration. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000). 
The Utah criminal provisions are nearly identical to the federal provisions. Pursu-
tifying civil "penalties," as separate from "criminal penalties"). It does not permit 
additional "criminal penalties." 
Indeed, that provision should not be construed to permit double convictions for the 
same conduct, since such an interpretation would violate the double jeopardy provisions 
of the state and federal constitutions. See Utah Const, art. I, § 12; U.S. Const, amend. V. 
"The language 'in addition to other penalties provided by law' contained in [one 
provision (but not in the other provision)] does not rise to the level of clear authorization 
for multiple punishments." U.S. v. Kaiser, 893 F.2d 1300,1304 (11th Cir. 1990) 
(emphasis added). 
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ant to 26 U.S.C. § 7201, any person who "willfully attempts in any mainner to evade or 
defeat any tax imposed by this title or the payment thereof1 is guilty of a felony under 
federal law. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(c). Pursuant to 26 U.S. C. § 7203, 
any person required to pay a federal tax or to make a federal return, who willfully "fails to 
pay such estimated tax or tax, make such return, keep such records, or supply such 
information, at the time or times required by law or regulations, shall, in addition to other 
penalties provided by law, be guilty of a misdemeanor." Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-
8-1101(l)(b)(1995).6 
Under the federal provisions, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth 
Circuit has ruled that the government may not obtain a conviction against a defendant 
under both Sections 7201 and 7203 for defendant's failure to file a return and to pay taxes 
in the same year. In United States v. Newman, 468 F.2d 791 (5th Cir. 1972), cert, 
denied, 411 U.S. 905 (1973), "[defendant was indicted for violating 26 U.S.C.A. § 7201 
(a felony-willful attempt to evade income tax liability) and 26 U.S.C.A. § 7203 (a 
misdemeanor-willful failure to file a tax return) and charged with eight separate counts, 
6 The federal courts have interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 7201 to require proof of the following 
elements: "willfulness, the existence of a tax deficiency, and an affirmative act 
constituting an evasion or attempted evasion of the tax." The federal courts have 
interpreted 26 U.S.C. § 7203 to require proof of "willfulness and failure to make a return 
when due." See U.S. v. Dovle. 956 F.2d 73, 74 (5th Cir. 1992). Federal courts 
interpreting the relevant provisions have ruled that § 7201, which penalizes affirmative 
conduct, is a greater offense, while § 7201, which penalizes passive conduct, is a lesser-
included offense. Consequently, the government is prohibited from obtaining a con-
viction under both §§ 7201 and 7203 against defendant for the same tax year. See U.S. v. 
Buckley. 586 F.2d 498, 504-05 (5th Cir. 1978), cert denied. 440 U.S. 982 (1979). 
18 
one for each section for each of the years from 1967 through 1970." Id. at 793. 
At trial, the government presented evidence to support that defendant failed to file 
a return and he had income for the relevant years. The jury found defendant guilty on all 
charges relating to 1968-1970, and acquitted him on the charges for 1967. Id. at 793. 
On appeal, the defendant claimed he should not have been convicted of two counts 
for each tax year. The government agreed: 
Defendant's final contention, that imposition of consecutive sentences for the two 
charges was improper, is conceded by the government in its brief, and we agree 
that the trial court erred in this respect. Where a defendant's conduct violates two 
separate statutes, it is improper to impose sentences under both statutes where one 
offense (here, § 7203, the misdemeanor) is, in effect, a lesser included offense of 
the other (here § 7201, the felony). See United States v. Rosenthal, 2 Cir. 1972, 
454 F. 2d 1252,1255. It is clear that "Congress did not intend two punishments for 
the same crime" id. We therefore vacate the three six-month sentences and the 
convictions for violation of § 7203, the misdemeanor counts. Since it would be 
improper for the trial court to now undertake modification of the felony counts, see 
Kennedy v. United States, 9 Cir. 1964, 330 F.2d 26; United States v. Adams, 6 Cir. 
1966, 362 F.2d 210; see also Chandler v. United States, 5 Cir., 468 F.2d 834, 
1972, it is unnecessary for us to remand the case to the trial court. The judgment is 
therefore modified by vacating the convictions and sentences on the three § 7203 
counts and, as so modified, is affirmed. 
Newman. 468 F.2d at 796; see also Buckley. 586 F.2d at 504-05 (defendant's convictions 
for both tax evasion and failure to file in each given year constituted double convictions 
in violation of the law; court vacated a conviction relating to each year). 
In U.S. v. Dovle. 956 F.2d 73, the Fifth Circuit ruled that Sections 7201 and 7203 
are in a relationship of "included" offenses. Id at 74. Thus, in the defendant's case for a 
violation of Section 7201, he was entitled to have the jury instructed on the lesser-
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included offense set forth at § 7203, as an alternative basis for the conviction. Id at 76. 
In U.S. v. Kaiser. 893 F.2d 1300 (11th Cir. 1990), defendant was charged with and 
convicted of two counts of tax evasion for each year that he filed a false return. Counts 
one and two of the indictment alleged violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 for willful attempt 
to evade and defeat a tax for the years 1979 and 1980; and counts three and four alleged 
violations of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1) for filing false returns in 1979 and 1980. Id at 1301. 
For each year in issue, the government obtained a conviction for filing a false return and 
failing to pay taxes due. On appeal, the defendant claimed the two convictions per year 
violated his rights under the double jeopardy clause. The United States Court of Appeal 
for the Eleventh Circuit agreed. Id at 1306-07. 
It ruled that the "tax evasion" under Section 7201 for each year was accomplished 
"solely by means of filing a false return under oath" in violation of Section 7206(1). Id. 
1306; see also id. at 1306-07 (citing "other circuits" that have considered the relationship 
between §§ 7201 & 7203 and concluded the same). The court vacated one conviction for 
each year. Id 1307; see also U.S. v. Snvder. 766 F.2d 167, 171 (4th Cir. 1985) 
(defendant may not be convicted of tax evasion and failure to file for same year). 
Inasmuch as the Utah provisions are similar to the federal provisions, they should 
be construed in the same fashion. A comparison of the Utah statutory elements at issue in 
this case supports that the state charged Smith twice for the same conduct and obtained a 
double conviction. Here, the state alleged that Smith evaded a tax by failing to make a 
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tax return. Both subsections (l)(b) and (l)(c) proscribe the same conduct and rely on the 
same proof. Indeed, since the same act of evading taxes is necessary to both charges, 
they merge. Also, as set forth in the federal analysis, the provisions may be construed to 
stand in an included-offense relationship. 
The "merger" doctrine applies in this case. Pursuant to Section 76-1-402(3), Smith 
respectfully requests that this Court vacate a conviction. 
2. The Evidence in this Case Reflects a "Single Criminal Episode." 
Under Section 76-1-402(1), a single-criminal episode is defined as "all conduct 
which is closely related in time and is incident to an attempt or an accomplishment of a 
single criminal objective." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999). In considering application 
of the single-criminal-episode doctrine, the Utah Supreme Court has stated the following: 
. . . [T]he general test as to whether there are separate offenses or one offense is 
whether the evidence discloses one general intent or discloses separate and distinct 
intents. The particular facts and circumstances of each case determine this 
question. If there is but one intention, one general impulse, and one plan, even 
though there is a series of transactions, there is but one offense 
Kimbel. 620 P.2d at 518 (quoting People v. Howes, 222 P.2d 969 (Cal. Ct. App. 1950)); 
see also Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-401 (1999); State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638,645 (Utah 
1996) (quoting KimbeL 620 P.2d at 518). 
In State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, the state charged defendant with three counts of 
theft, alleging that "between November of 1991 and June of 1992, Crosby 
misappropriated company funds for her personal use." Id. at 640. Defendant was 
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convicted on the counts as charged, and she appealed. The supreme court ruled that the 
trial court erred in permitting the three convictions for theft. According to the court, 
"[t]he evidence in this case demonstrates that although the transactions underlying 
Crosby's theft convictions occurred over a period of time, they were part of a single plan 
and should have been charged as a single offense." Id at 645. The court remanded the 
matter and ordered the trial court to consolidate the convictions into one. Id. at 646. 
In considering application of § 76-1-402(1) here, this Court will assess whether the 
conduct in this case was closely related in time and whether such conduct was "incident 
to an attempt or an accomplishment of a single criminal objective" to support a single 
offense. State v. Keppler. 1999 UT App 89, Tf5, 976 P.2d 99 (cite omitted); see ateo State 
v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381, 391 n. 14 (Utah App. 1997) (recognizing that under the 
"single-criminal-episode" doctrine, the court will consider whether conduct at issue was 
related in time and whether evidence supported a single criminal objective). 
To that end, the evidence here reflects that while Smith failed to file a return and to 
pay taxes, the conduct in this case was a result of a single objective or a single event. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-402(1); 76-1-401. 
Specifically, in this case, the timing factor was met. According to tax law, Smith 
was required to file a state return and to pay taxes on or before a specific date. He failed 
to do so. His failure to comply with the law by the due date supports the timing factor 
under the single-criminal-episode doctrine. 
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Next, the evidence in this case reflects one general plan. See Kimbel. 620 P.2d at 
518. According to the state's evidence, Smith evaded payment in 1995 by failing to file a 
return. Although the state charged the conduct under two separate provisions (§ 76-8-
1101(1 )(b) and (l)(c)), as set forth above, those provisions define the same crime and rely 
on the same proof. Both required proof of intentional/willful conduct and both required 
proof that defendant evaded a tax. See supra. Point LA. 1. Under either provision, 
evading a tax could be accomplished by failing to file a return, or filing a fraudulent 
return, among other things. In this case, Smith allegedly evaded the tax by failing to file a 
return. Smith's alleged conduct supported a single plan that should have been charged as 
a single offense. Pursuant to Utah law, the trial court erred when it refused to vacate one 
of the convictions in this case. 
B. A CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED. 
When a defendant has been wrongly convicted of two offenses - arising from a 
single-criminal episode or under the merger doctrine — a conviction must be vacated. 
Shaffer. 725 P.2d at 1313-15 (court vacated a conviction); Ml, 674 P.2d at 96-98 (where 
defendant was wrongly convicted of aggravated robbery and theft, court vacated 
conviction); (R. 595-602 (defense requested that trial court vacate conviction)). 
A violation of § 76-1-402 generally warrants the entry of an order vacating the 
conviction for the lesser offense. In the context of this case, it would be appropriate for 
the Court to vacate the conviction for the second degree felony offense, attempted willful 
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evasion, for two reasons. First, this Court may apply the remedy that it deems appropriate. 
See State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201,1209-1211 (Utah 1993) (court recognizes that in 
fashioning remedy, it may modify judgment as it deems appropriate); see also State v. 
Powasnik. 918 P.2d 146, 150 n. 2 (Utah App. 1996); Utah R. App. P. 30(b) (2000). 
To that end, this Court may apply the maxim that the more specific statute controls 
over the more general statute. See State v. Lowder. 889 P.2d 412, 414 (Utah 1994); State 
v. Vigil. 842 P.2d 843, 845 (Utah 1992). Here, subsection (l)(b) (intentional evasion) is 
more specific and appropriate than subsection (l)(c) (attempted willful evasion). Also, 
the evidence before the jury supported that Smith was passive in his conduct, where he 
failed to file a return. He did not take affirmative steps to evade taxes. See supra, note 6. 
Subsection (l)(b) more accurately describes and proscribes the conduct at issue here. On 
that basis, the conviction under subsection (l)(c) should be vacated. 
Second, under Utah law, "where there is doubt or uncertainty as to which of two 
punishments is applicable to an offense," the accused "is entitled to the benefit of the 
lesser." State v. Shondel. 453 P.2d 146,148 (Utah 1969); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-
17-1 (1999) ("When it appears the defendant has committed a public offense and there is 
reasonable doubt as to which of two or more degrees he is guilty, he shall be convicted 
only of the lower degree"). Here, the attempted willful evasion charge carries a penalty 
of one to fifteen years. The intentional evasion charge carries a penalty of zero to five 
years. The more severe second degree penalty for attempted willful evasion should be 
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vacated. Utah Code Ann. § 77-17-1. 
For the reasons set forth above, and pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-402(1) and 
(3), Smith respectfully requests the entry of an order vacating a conviction. 
POINT II. SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO AN INSTRUCTION ON HIS 
GOOD-FAITH BELIEF. 
A. UTAH LAW ENTITLES A DEFENDANT TO PRESENT HIS THEORY OR 
DEFENSE IN THE FORM OF AN INSTRUCTION TO THE JURY. 
A defendant has the right to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a 
clear and understandable way." State v. Potter. 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); see also 
State v. Smith. 706 P.2d 1052,1058 (Utah 1985); Jorgensen v. Issa. 739 P.2d 80, 82 
(Utah Ct. App. 1987); State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232,238 (Utah 1995) (trial court has 
duty to instruct jury on the law applicable to the case) (quoting Potter. 627 P.2d at 78); 
State v. Garcia. 2001 UT App 19, J8,18 P.3d 1123. That right comports with funda-
mental fairness. Potter. 627 P.2d at 78 (defendant was denied a fair trial "on the critical 
issues of the case" where the instructions could have misled and confused the jury). 
Where a defendant has requested proper instructions as they relate to his theory of 
the case, "[fjailure to give requested instructions is reversible error if it tends to mislead 
the jury to the prejudice of the complaining party or insufficiently or erroneously advises 
the jury on the law." Jorgensen. 739 P.2d at 82 (citing InreEstateofKesler. 702 P.2d 86, 
96 (Utah 1985)). In this case, the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to 
instruct the jury on Smith's "good-faith" defense. 
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B. UNDER THE TAX LAWS. A DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO CLAIM IN 
HIS DEFENSE THAT HE BELIEVED IN "GOOD FAITH" THAT THE TAX 
LAWS WERE NOT APPLICABLE TO HIM. THEREBY NEGATING 
CRIMINAL INTENT. 
The Utah tax statutes were enacted to conform to the federal statutes. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-102(4) (2000). Indeed, subsections 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (c) of the 
Utah Code are nearly identical to 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 7201, 7203. Both the state and federal 
provisions make it unlawful for a person to intentionally/willfully evade a tax. Compare 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b),(c); with 26 U.S.C. A. §§ 7201 and 7203: see supra. 
Point I. 
In construing the federal tax provisions, the U.S. Supreme Court has specified that 
the government must prove specific intent to support a willful tax evasion. See Cheek v. 
U.S.. 498 U.S. 192,194,200-01 (1991). A copy of the Cheek decision is attached as 
Addendum D. Congress incorporated a specific intent element into the provisions in 
order that a person would not be held criminally liable for a "bona fide misunderstanding" 
of the law. IcL at 200 (quoting United States v. Murdock. 290 U.S. 389,226 (1933)). 
Thus, for a "willful" or "intentional" tax evasion, the government must prove "that 
the law imposed a duty on the defendant, that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he 
voluntarily and intentionally violated that duty." Cheek. 498 U.S. at 201: see also U.S. v. 
Barnett. 945 F.2d 1296,1298 (5th Cir. 1991) ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that the defendant charged with willful failure to file a tax return must have willfully 
failed to file knowing that he had a legal duty to do so"), cert, denied. 503 U.S. 941 
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(1992) (citing CheeL 498 U.S. at 200; U.S. v. Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10 (1976); U.S. v. 
Bishop 412 U.S. 346 (1973)). 
The Court in Cheek also recognized the "good-faith" belief defense. By way of 
explanation, in Cheek the government charged defendant with multiple counts of income 
tax evasion for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 through 1986.7 Cheek, 498 U.S. at 194. 
Cheek represented himself at trial and testified in his defense. He admitted that he 
had not filed personal income tax returns during the years in question. He 
testified that as early as 1978, he had begun attending seminars sponsored by, and 
following the advice of, a group that believes, among other things, that the federal 
tax system is unconstitutional. Some of the speakers at these meetings were 
lawyers who purported to give professional opinions about the invalidity of the 
federal income tax laws. Cheek produced a letter from an attorney stating that the 
Sixteenth Amendment did not authorize a tax on wages and salaries but only on 
gain or profit. Petitioner's defense was that, based on the indoctrination he received 
from this group and from his own study, he sincerely believed that the tax laws 
were being unconstitutionally enforced and that his actions during the 1980-1986 
period were lawful. He therefore argued that he had acted without the willfulness 
required for conviction of the various offenses with which he was charged. 
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 195-96. 
At the conclusion of trial, the judge in Cheek instructed the jury that "an 
objectively reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of the law would negate willfulness, 
7 In Cheek, the defendant did not ask the Court to apply the merger doctrine or any vari-
ation on that doctrine to the multiple charges filed against him for each tax year. See 
Cheek. 498 U.S. at 193-94. Therefore, the Court in Cheek did not address the multiple 
charges. Cheek cannot be construed to govern the issues raised in Smith's Point I, supra. 
See Horton v. Goldminer's Daughter, 785 P.2d 1087,1090 (Utah 1989) (where there is 
"no analysis" on a point of law in a cited case, this Court will not consider the cited case 
to govern the matter; the case will have "little persuasive effect" and will not constitute 
authority on the matter); see State v. Ostler. 2001 UT 68, %6 n.2, 31 P.3d 528 (rejecting 
case law that is not dispositive of the issue). 
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but mere disagreement with the law would not." Id. at 196. Also, "'[a]n honest but 
unreasonable belief is not a defense and does not negate willfulness,'" and "['a]dvice or 
research resulting in the conclusion that wages of a privately employed person are not 
income or that the tax laws are unconstitutional is not objectively reasonable and cannot 
serve as the basis for a good faith misunderstanding of the law defense,'" Id. at 197. 
The jury convicted Cheek on all counts, and he appealed. The United States 
Supreme Court ultimately reviewed the matter, and ruled that the trial judge improperly 
instructed the jury on the good-faith defense. Id at 201. According to the Court, a "good-
faith" misunderstanding of the law is a defense in a prosecution for tax crimes. 
The United States Supreme Court began its analysis of the "good-faith" defense by 
recognizing that ignorance of the law generally "is no defense to [a] criminal 
prosecution." Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199. However, in a case where the government is 
required to prove specific intent or willfulness, ignorance will negate intent. 
[I]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the 
prosecution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the 
willfulness requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's 
claim of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the 
law, he had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of 
the tax laws. 
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202. 
In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has 
proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if 
the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or 
not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. 
Id. at 202. 
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Under the United States Supreme Court analysis, evidence of a good-faith belief 
did not have to be "objectively reasonable" to negate criminal willfulness. Id at 203. 
Also, if the jury believed Cheek's evidence of a good-faith belief, "the Government 
would not have carried its burden to prove willfulness, however unreasonable a court 
might deem such a belief." Id. at 202. 
The Supreme Court recognized that even though the jury was at liberty to discredit 
the defendant's claims and find that defendant was "aware of his duty to file a return," id. 
at 202, the matter remained an issue for the jury. Indeed, "[knowledge and belief are 
characteristically questions for the factfinder, in this case the jury." Id. at 203. Forbid-
ding the jury to consider the defendant's "evidence that might negate willfulness would 
raise a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provisions." Id. at 203. 
In the end, the United States Supreme Court found reversible error, where the trial 
court improperly "instruct[ed] the jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's understanding 
that, within the meaning of the tax laws, he was not a person required to file a return or to 
pay income taxes and that wages are not taxable income, as incredible as such 
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the law might be." Id. at 203.8 The case was 
8 The Supreme Court ruled that in his defense, the defendant was entitled to present 
evidence that he believed in good-faith that the tax laws did not relate to "income" and 
"wages." However, the defendant was not entitled to have the jury consider his "belief1 
that the tax laws were unconstitutional. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 206-07. The Court considered 
the latter views to be irrelevant. Id Also, the Supreme Court ruled that defendant was 
not entitled to an acquittal as a matter of law as a result of his "good-faith" beliefs. See 
id at 204-207. He was entitled only to have the jury consider his defense. 
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remanded for further proceedings. Id at 207. 
In sum, Cheek supports the following: [1] The government must prove specific 
intent to support a conviction under the tax evasion statutes. Cheek, 498 U.S. at 200. [2] 
Although mistake of law generally is not a defense, id. at 199, a defendant's misunder-
standing of the law constitutes a "good-faith" defense in a criminal tax case where the 
government must prove specific intent to support the conviction. Id. at 202-03. [3] The 
defendant's "good-faith" belief does not have to be reasonable; that is, an honest but un-
reasonable belief constitutes a valid defense. Id at 203. [4] When a defendant presents 
evidence of his good-faith belief, the government must present evidence to negate that 
belief beyond a reasonable doubt. Id at 202,203. [5] And when the defendant presents 
evidence of his good-faith belief, he is entitled to have the jury properly instructed on the 
matter. Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298. 
C. THE "GOOD-FAITH" BELIEF DEFENSE IS APPLICABLE HERE. 
When the Utah legislature enacted the state tax provisions, it intended to conform 
the Utah provisions to the federal law in order to promote consistency, and to promote a 
better understanding as to what is required under the laws. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-
102(4) (2000). 
The Utah legislature also enacted criminal tax provisions similar to the federal 
provisions. Compare Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), (c); 26 U.S.C. §§ 7201, 7203; 
see supra. Point I, herein. Where Utah law is modeled after federal law, Utah appellate 
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courts will look to federal law to aid in interpreting the Utah provisions. State v. Gray. 
717 P.2d 1313,1317 (Utah 1986); PowasniL 918 P.2d at 149; State v. Chavez. 840 P.2d 
846, 848 n.l (Utah Ct. App. 1992), cert denied. 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993). To that end, 
this Court should find that when the legislature enacted § 76-8-1101, it intended to 
incorporate the definition for "intent" and "willful" that is found in federal tax law. 
That is, as set forth in Cheek, the government must prove specific intent under the 
Utah criminal tax provisions: "Willfulness, as construed by our prior decisions in criminal 
tax cases, requires the Government to prove that the law imposed a duty on the defendant, 
that the defendant knew of this duty, and that he voluntarily and intentionally violated that 
duty." Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201; see also kL at 200 (Supreme Court first articulated the 
specific intent showing for tax cases in 1933). 
If this Court interprets Section 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c) to require proof of 
specific intent as set forth in Cheek, such an interpretation will comport with the intent of 
the legislature as set forth in § 59-10-102(4) (legislature intended Utah tax laws to 
conform to federal law), and it will ensure that Utah tax laws are consistent with the 
federal provisions in administration and application. Such an interpretation also will 
support application of the "good-faith" defense under Utah law, as further set forth below. 
1. Where the Government Must Prove Specific Intent to Support a Conviction 
Under Utah Law for Tax Evasion, the Defendant Is Entitled to Present the Good-
Faith Defense. 
Utah law is consistent with Cheek in that "ignorance of the law or a mistake of 
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law" generally is not a defense to a criminal prosecution. Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-2-304(2) (1995). Indeed, under Utah statutory law, ignorance or mistake 
of law is a defense when it is due to defendant's reasonable belief that his conduct did not 
constitute a crime, and the defendant relied upon an official interpretation of the law 
made by an agency that is responsible for interpreting the law. Id. § 76-2-304 (2)(b).9 
In addition, Utah law is consistent with Cheek in that mistake of law is a defense 
in a case where the government is required to prove specific intent to support a convic-
tion. In that instance, the defendant is not required to make the showing set forth at § 76-
2-304(2)(b). The defendant simply may present testimony that he misunderstood the law. 
In State v. Granato. 610 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1980), the defendant, who represented a 
liquor distillery, made a political contribution to Scott Matheson's campaign for 
governor. Id. at 1291. Utah law in effect at the time made it illegal for a distiller of 
intoxicating liquors to make such contributions. Id. at 1291 n.l & 1293 (citing Utah Code 
Ann. § 32-4-22 (1979 Supp.)). A violation of § 32-4-22 constituted a third degree felony. 
Although Mr. Matheson declined the contribution, the state prosecuted defendant 
for an attempt to commit the offense. At trial, the defendant claimed, and the state 
stipulated, that defendant "had no knowledge of the existence of the statute in question, 
nor of any legal prohibition against making campaign contributions." Id at 1291-92. 
That is, defendant was ignorant of the law. At the conclusion of trial, the judge found 
9 Under Utah law, a mistake of fact is a defense to a criminal prosecution. Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-304(1) (1995). 
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defendant guilty. IdL 
On appeal, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that in order to sustain a conviction for 
the offense, the state was required to prove that defendant had specific intent, or "guilty 
knowledge" that he was violating the statute. Id. at 1292. In that regard, an "inference of 
guilty knowledge" would not suffice to sustain the conviction. Id The supreme court 
further ruled that on the facts of the case, the state could not establish a crime. Indeed, 
since the state stipulated "that the defendant had no knowledge of the prohibitory statute," 
that evidence "expressly negatived" any inference of criminal intent. Id. Under Granato, 
a misunderstanding of the law served as a defense to a specific-intent crime. 
The rule in Granato is consistent with Cheek, where the defendant may present 
evidence that he misunderstood the law, as a defense to a specific-intent crime. 
Next, the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that a subjective "mistake" will serve as a 
defense to a criminal prosecution. See State v. Johnson, 821 P.2d 1150, 1158 (Utah 
1991) ("subjective mistake" by the defendant as to the presence of an "aggravating 
circumstance" would be a defense to a charge of attempted aggravated murder); State v. 
Elton. 680 P.2d 727, 730 (Utah 1984) (in considering Section 76-2-304, "ignorance or 
mistake" bears on the subjective state of mind of the defendant). 
Also, the Utah Supreme Court has recognized that a person may present a "good-
faith" belief defense in a civil tax proceeding. Such a defense may be based on an 
"arguable point of law." Hales Sand & Gravel Inc. v. Audit Division of the Utah State 
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Tax Commission, 842 P.2d 887, 895 (Utah 1992) ("the taxpayer can escape the [tax] 
penalty if he or she can show that he or she based the nonpayment of taxes on a 
legitimate, good faith interpretation of an arguable point of law"); Chicago Bridge & Iron 
Co. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 839 P.2d 303, 309 (Utah 1992). 
In several respects, Utah law is consistent with Cheek. Thus, the good-faith 
defense in Cheek applies to a prosecution under Section 76-8-1101(l)(b), (l)(c) (1995). 
In sum, Utah law and Cheek are consistent as follows: 
[1] The Utah legislature intended the state tax provisions to comport with the 
federal provisions, and the Utah tax crimes are nearly identical to the federal crimes. This 
Court will look to federal law to interpret the Utah provisions. To that end, the govern-
ment must prove specific intent to support a conviction under the Utah provisions.10 
[2] While a "mistake of law" generally is not a defense, under Utah law a 
defendant's misunderstanding of the law constitutes a defense in a criminal case where 
the government must prove specific intent to support the conviction.11 
[3] Under Utah law, a defendant's good-faith belief does not have to be 
10 See Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (legislature intended Utah tax law to conform to 
federal law); Gray. 717 P.2d at 1317 (where state law is modeled after federal law, court 
will look to federal interpretations); Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200 (federal tax law requires 
proof of specific intent io support criminal conviction). 
11 See Cheek. 498 U.S. at 199,202-03 (while mistake of law is generally not a defense, 
it exists where the government is required to prove specific intent); Utah Code Ann. § 76-
2-304(2) (mistake of law is generally not a defense); Granato, 610 P.2d 1290 (ignorance 
of law is a defense where government is required to prove "guilty knowledge"). 
34 
reasonable; that is, an honest but unreasonable belief constitutes a valid defense.12 
[4] A good-faith belief may be based on an "arguable point of law."13 
[5] A good-faith belief negates specific intent. When the defendant presents 
evidence that negates a criminal mental state, it remains with the government to persuade 
the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as to each element of the crime. That means, the state 
has the burden to disprove the affirmative defense.14 
[6] When the defendant presents evidence of his theory of the case, he is entitled to 
have the jury properly instructed on the matter.15 
In the end, the good-faith defense applies under Utah law in a case for tax evasion. 
2. The Federal and State Tax Provisions Overlap, Entitling a Defendant to the 
Good-Faith Defense in State Proceedings. 
The "good-faith" defense set forth in Cheek is available under Utah law for 
additional reasons. Specifically, under the Utah criminal tax provisions, the state must 
show that defendant was required to file a correct tax return, but failed to do so. See Utah 
12 See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203; Johnson, 821 P.2d at 1158 (a subjective mistake is a 
defense); Elton, 680 P.2d at 730 (considering subjective state of mind of the defendant). 
13 See CheeL 498 U.S. at 200-03; Hales Sand, 842 P.2d at 895 (a taxpayer will escape 
liability if he can show that he based nonpayment of taxes on a good-faith interpretation 
of an arguable point of law); Chicago Bridge. 839 P.2d at 309. 
14 See Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202-03; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2) (1999); see also Potter, 
627 P.2d at 79 (voluntary intoxication is a defense if it negates mental state); State v. 
Knoll, 712 P.2d 211,214-15 (Utah 1985); State v. Tebbs, 786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1990). 
15 See Barnett, 945 F.2d at 1298; see also Potter, 627 P.2d at 78; Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 
238 (trial court has duty to instruct jury on the law applicable to the case). 
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Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b) and (l)(c). Under Utah law, a person is required to file a 
state tax return if he was required to file a federal return. Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-502(1) 
(2000). The state provisions overlap with the federal provisions. A defendant who failed 
to make a federal filing may present the "good-faith" belief defense. Cheek. 498 U.S. at 
200-03. Where the defendant believes in good faith that he was not required to file a 
federal return, that defense must be available to explain why defendant likewise failed to 
file a return under the state provisions. That is, since the state and federal filing 
requirements overlap, a defendant must be allowed to raise the good-faith defense in state 
criminal proceedings. 
Also, a defendant's right to present his theory of the case with the use of clear and 
understandable instructions has its genesis in the right to fundamental fairness at trial and 
the right to a jury trial. If a defendant is denied the opportunity to present his defense in 
the form of instructions to the jury, he may be denied his rights under the Sixth 
Amendment of the federal constitution. The United States Supreme Court in Cheek 
stated, "forbidding the jury to consider evidence that might negate willfulness would raise 
a serious question under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial provision." Cheek. 498 U.S. at 
203. By failing to instruct the jury on Smith's defense, the trial judge in this case left the 
jury without the necessary tools with which to make a proper determination regarding 
Smith's culpability. That was error. 
D. SMITH WAS ENTITLED TO HAVE THE JURY INSTRUCTED ON HIS 
GOOD-FAITH BELIEF. 
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1. Smith Presented Evidence of His Good-Faith Belief. 
Under Utah law, before a defendant is entitled to have a jury instructed on his 
defense, there must be some evidence of the defense in the record. See KnolL 712 P.2d at 
214 (when there is a basis in the evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the 
prosecution or by the defendant, which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury 
to consider the defense, an instruction should be given to the jury). 
Here, Smith presented evidence of good faith. (See R. 936:447-75); State v. Tebbs. 
786 P.2d 775, 779 (Utah App. 1990) (the defendant assumes the burden of producing 
some evidence if there is no evidence in the prosecution's case that would provide an 
evidentiary foundation for the defense claimed); Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-504 (1999). 
He presented evidence to support that he studied in good faith to determine 
whether he was required to file a state or federal tax return. Smith conducted research 
and read the Internal Revenue Code. (R. 936:447-48,460-62,475.) Through his research, 
Smith learned that income could be derived from "non-taxable" sources, without taxable 
liability; and he learned about sources of income within and without the United States. 
(R. 936:443,470-71.) He also relied on articles and sought "professional opinions" in 
determining whether he was required under the law to file a return. (R. 936:449.) Smith 
was unable to locate any law that required him to file a tax return. 
Smith asked judges and lawyers to identify for him those laws requiring him to file 
a return. Smith testified that the judges and lawyers were not able to answer his 
37 
questions. Smith testified that he sent letters to the state tax commission for information 
and he made other efforts to ascertain his obligations as far as the tax laws were 
concerned, but he received no response. Smith presented various theories and arguments 
to judges and after his arguments were rejected, he continued to study more information 
to refine his understanding of the law. (R. 936:460-64,474-75,488-90, 507.) 
Smith determined after reviewing federal and state law and after questioning 
several individuals regarding his tax obligations, that he was not a person required to file 
a return under the law. (R. 936:475.) 
Smith's honest and good-faith belief was a question for the jury. See Cheek, 498 
U.S. at 203 (jury must be allowed to consider good-faith belief). Where the evidence 
supports that Smith was mistaken in good faith about his status as a person required to file 
state tax returns, that affirmative defense negates criminal intent. Smith was entitled to 
have the jury instructed on his good-faith mistake of fact under Utah law. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-2-304(1): see also State v. Kazda. 545 P.2d 190, 192 (Utah 1976) Qury was 
instructed in an understandable way that an honest mistake of fact constituted a defense); 
see supra, note 9, herein. 
In the event this Court determines that Smith's defense constituted a misunder-
standing of the law, he was entitled to have the jury consider whether that good-faith 
misunderstanding negated willfulness and intent. "A defendant charged with willful 
failure to file a tax return is [] entitled to instructions that adequately inform the jury that 
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the defendant is not guilty if he holds the mistaken, but good faith, belief that he is not 
required to file a tax return (at least assuming, as is the case here, that such is raised by 
the evidence)." Barnett 945 F.2d at 1298 (citing Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200); see also Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000) (legislature intended Utah tax provisions to conform to 
federal provisions); Gray, 717 P.2d at 1317 (where Utah provisions are modeled after 
federal provisions, Utah courts will look to federal interpretations); Hales Sand. 842 P.2d 
at 895 (under Utah law, a taxpayer will escape liability if he can show that he based 
nonpayment of taxes on a good-faith interpretation of an arguable point of law). 
Smith presented evidence to negate specific criminal intent. According to the 
evidence, he made every effort to understand the law and to conform to the law. As set 
forth above, the "trial court [had] a duty to instruct the jury on the law applicable to the 
facts of the case .. .[and the] defendant [had] a right 'to have his [or her] theory of the 
case presented to the jury in a clear and understandable way." Hamilton, 827 P.2d at 238 
(cite omitted). On that basis, Smith was entitled to a proper instruction. 
2. Smith Requested an Instruction Regarding His Good-Faith Belief. 
Smith proposed an instruction to the jury concerning his good-faith belief. (R. 
502.) A copy of that instruction is attached hereto as Addendum E. Smith requested that 
the trial judge instruct the jury with respect to willfulness and the good-faith defense as 
set forth in Cheek, and as set forth in the first four paragraphs of the proposed instruction 
(R. 960:194-209), as follows: 
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Turning now to the third element of this offense. You are instructed that 
the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's failure 
to make a return was willful. Willfulness [is] the voluntary, intentional violation 
of a known legal duty. 
This means that before you can convict the defendant of willful failure to 
file a 1995 state tax return and evasion of a tax[,] the state [must] prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that failure to make a return was willful. 
The defendant's failure to make a return was willful if the law imposed a 
duty on defendant to file a return; he know of this duty; and he voluntarily and 
intentionally violated that duty. 
The defendant's conduct was not willful if he acted through negligence, 
inadvertence, mistake, or due to a good faith misunderstanding of the law. If the 
defendant had a subjective good faith belief, no mater how unreasonable, that the 
law did not require him to file tax returns, he did not act willfully. However, if the 
defendant failed to make a return either because he disagreed with the tax laws or 
he thought the tax laws to be unconstitutional, these beliefs would not amount to a 
good faith misunderstanding of the law so as to excuse his failure to make tax 
returns. 
(R. 502.) Smith's proposed instruction was modeled after Cheek. See supra Point II.B. 
It was consistent with the law and the facts presented in this case. See supra Point II.B., 
C, D. 1. The instruction should have been given to the jury. The trial court rejected the 
instruction. (R. 960:194-209.) The trial court's ruling is attached as Addendum F. That 
was improper. See Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298 (a defendant charged with willful tax 
evasion is entitled to instructions that inform the jury that the defendant is not guilty if he 
holds the mistaken, but good faith, belief that he is not required to file tax return). 
Next, the instructions provided to the jury failed to address the good-faith defense. 
A set of the instructions provided to the jury is attached as Addendum G. 
In this case, the trial judge instructed the jury on the statutory definitions for the 
terms "intentionally," "with intent or willfully," "knowingly," "recklessly," and "with 
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criminal negligence." (R. 579.) That instruction did not address "intentionally" or 
"willfully" as those terms related to the tax evasion charges or the good-faith defense. See 
Barnett 945 F.2d at 1298 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the defendant 
charged with willful failure to file a tax return must have willfully failed to file knowing 
that he had a legal duty to do so") (citing Cheek. 498 U.S. at 200; U.S. v. Pomponio. 429 
U.S. 10(1976); U.S. v. Bishop, 412 U.S. 346(1973)): see also Cheek, 498 U.S. at 201. 
Smith was entitled to a proper instruction on "intentionally" and "willfully" in connection 
with his good-faith defense.16 
Also, while the trial court instructed the jury that defendant presented evidence of 
his studies, that instruction did not discuss the good-faith defense. (R. 580.) In fact, the 
trial court advised the jury that defendant's evidence related to "whether or not the 
defendant's failure to timely file a tax return for 1995 was knowing and willful and you 
should not consider it for any other purpose." (R. 580-81.) That was inadequate. 
The instructions failed to advise the jury that a good-faith belief may negate 
criminal intent and willfulness, and therefore support an acquittal on the charges. They 
failed to advise the jury that in light of the defense, the state would be required to refute 
the good-faith belief with evidence that supported intent beyond a reasonable doubt. See 
16 As set forth above, where the Utah tax provisions were enacted to conform to the 
federal provisions, Utah Code Ann. § 59-10-102 (2000), and where the Utah legislature 
enacted criminal provisions nearly identical to the federal provisions, this Court will look 
to federal law in interpreting the Utah statutes. Gray, 717 P.2d at 1317; PowasniL 918 
P.2d at 149. In that regard, the federal definitions for "intentionally " and "willfully" as 
set forth in Cheek also define those terms as used in the Utah criminal tax provisions. 
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Cheek. 498 U.S. at 202 (the government's burden requires "negating a defendant's claim 
of ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law" he had a 
good-faith belief that he was not violating the law); KnolL 712 P.2d at 214-15 (if a 
defense is raised, the prosecution is required to refute the defense by proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt); Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^11; Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2) 
(government must negate a defense that is in issue as a result of evidence presented at 
trial). The instructions did not allow the jury to consider Smith's good-faith defense in 
any relevant context, and the instructions did not inform the jury that evidence of good-
faith may serve to negate the criminal intent or willfulness. That was error. 
3. Smith Suffered Prejudice as a Result of the Error. 
This Court will consider whether the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the 
good-faith defense was prejudicial. To that end, this Court specifically will not assess 
whether the evidence was sufficient to support the verdict and it will not "weigh the cre-
dibility of the evidence, a function reserved for the trier of fact." State v. Baker, 671 P.2d 
152, 159 (Utah 1983). Rather, this Court will decide whether there was some evidence in 
the record to support the instruction. See Baker. 671 P.2d at 159. That approach ensures 
that the jury will be allowed to weigh and interpret the evidence. Id.; see Cheek, 498 U.S. 
at 202-03 (it is for jury to decide whether evidence of good-faith belief negates elements 
of crime); Bamett, 945 F.2d at 1298 (a defendant charged with tax evasion is entitled to 
the good-faith defense instructions where there is evidence of the defense). 
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In short, this Court must remand the matter for a new trial if any interpretation of 
the evidence would support the defendant's theory of the case. See Baker, 671 P.2d at 
159; State v. Crick. 675 P.2d 527, 532 (Utah 1983). "The requirement is more than a 
procedural nicety; it is rooted in defendant's constitutional right to a jury trial." State v. 
Standiford. 769 P.2d 254, 266 (Utah 1988). 
In this case, the evidence supported an instruction on the good-faith defense. See 
supra Point ILD. 1. The trial court should have instructed the jury on that defense so that 
the jury could give meaning and context to the evidence. The jury should have been 
instructed on the matter so that it could evaluate the evidence in the appropriate light and 
determine whether defendant's evidence served to negate the intentional/willful element 
of each offense. If the jury had been allowed to consider the evidence in the proper 
context, it likely would have acquitted Smith of the charges. 
p]f the Government proves actual knowledge of the pertinent legal duty, the prose-
cution, without more, has satisfied the knowledge component of the willfulness 
requirement. But carrying this burden requires negating a defendant's claim of 
ignorance of the law or a claim that because of a misunderstanding of the law, he 
had a good-faith belief that he was not violating any of the provisions of the tax 
laws. This is so because one cannot be aware that the law imposes a duty upon 
him and yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the law, or believe that the duty does 
not exist. In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Govern-
ment has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot 
be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, 
whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable. 
Cheek, 498 U.S. at 202 (emphasis added). 
The trial court's failure to provide proper instructions prevented the jury from 
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considering "evidence that might negate willfulness," Cheek, 498 U.S. at 203, thereby 
undermining Smith's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial. On that basis, this Court 
should find prejudice as a result of the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury on the 
good-faith belief. 
ARGUMENT PRESENTED BY PRO SE DEFENDANT17 
THE STATE FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE OFFENSE OF TAX 
EVASION, 
Smith was convicted of two offenses in this matter: tax evasion a third degree 
felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(l)(b), and tax evasion, a second 
degree felony offense under Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1101(1 )(c), Smith maintains the 
evidence at trial was insufficient to support the conviction for either offense. 
"We reverse the jury's verdict in a criminal case when we conclude as a 
matter of law that the evidence was insufficient to warrant conviction," State v. 
Smith, 927 P.2d 649,651 (Utah Ct. App, 1996) (quoting State v. Harman, 1G1Y2& 
567, 568 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)). The defendant must overcome a heavy burden in 
challenging the sufficiency of evidence for a jury verdict. See id; State v. Vessey, 
967 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). We view the evidence in a light most 
favorable to the jury verdict,"State v. Bradley, 752 P.2d 874, 876 (Utah 1985), and 
"will reverse only if the evidence is so 'inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
committed the crime.9 Smith, 927 P.2d at 651 (quoting Harman, 767 P.2d at 568 
(quoting Stale v, Petree, 659 P,2d 37 443, 444 (Utah 1983))). However, though the 
burden is high, it is not impossible. See id. "We will not make speculative leaps 
across gaps in the evidence." Id. (internal quotations and alterations omitted). 
"Every element of the crime charged must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Harman, 767 P.2d at 568. "To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State 
has introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." 
Sm/Y/*,927P.2dat651. 
17 See supra, note 1, herein. 
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State v. Gonzales, 2000 UT App 136,110,2 P.3d 954; see also State v. Holgate. 2000 UT 
74,f 18; 10 P.3d 346; State v. Leleae. 1999 UT App 368,1[17, 993 P.2d 232. 
To succeed on a claim of insufficient evidence, the defendant "must marshal the 
evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient 
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict." State v. Boyd, 2001 UT 30,Tfl3, 
25 P.3d 985 (citing State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,1(14, 989 P.2d 1065). 
In the event the evidence presented at trial is contradictory or conflicting, so long 
as a reasonable interpretation of that evidence supports each element of the offense, this 
Court will not disturb the jury's verdict. See Bovd, 2001 UT 30,1J14. 
[W]e do not sit as a second trier of fact: "'It is the exclusive function of the jury to 
weigh the evidence and to determine the credibility of the witnesses.5 So long as 
there is some evidence, including reasonable inferences, from which findings of all 
the requisite elements of the crime can reasonably be made, our inquiry stops." 
Id. at H16 (quoting State v. Booker. 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (quoting State v. 
Lamm. 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980))); see also State v. Cravens. 2000 UT App 344, 
[^18, 15 P.3d 635 (it is the province of the trier of fact to determine which testimony to 
believe and what inferences to draw from the facts); State v. Chaney. 1999 UT App 
309,Tf30, 989 P.2d 1091 ("We may not weigh evidence or assess witness credibility, but 
instead "assume that the jury believed the evidence and inferences that support the 
verdict"); State v. James, 819 P.2d 781,784 (Utah 1991) (the mere existence of 
conflicting evidence does not warrant reversal). 
In addition, circumstantial evidence may be sufficient to support a conviction. It is 
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well settled that "a conviction can be based on sufficient circumstantial evidence." State 
v. Lvman. 966 P.2d 278, 281 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Brown. 948 P.2d 
337,344 (Utah 1997)). "'Circumstantial evidence need not be regarded as inferior 
evidence if it is of such quality and quantity as to justify a jury in determining guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt, and is sufficient to sustain a conviction."' Id. (quoting State v. 
Nickles. 728 P.2d 123, 127 (Utah 1986)); see State v. Span, 819 .P,2d 329, 332-33 (Utah 
1991). "[T]he inferences that can be drawn from th[e] evidence [must] have a basis in 
logic and reasonable human experience sufficient to prove each legal element of the 
offense beyond a reasonable doubt." Brown. 948 P.2d at 344 (quoting State v. Workman. 
852 P.2d 981, 985 (Utah 1993)). 
Nevertheless, if the verdict "is based solely on inferences that give rise to only re-
mote or speculative possibilities of guilt," the charge must be dismissed. Brown. 948 P.2d 
at 344; see also State v. Spainhower. 1999 UT App 280, 15, 988 P.2d 452 (reversal is 
required if the state has failed to establish an element of the offense with direct evidence 
or reasonable inferences). With that in mind, the function of a reviewing court is to ensure 
"that there is sufficient competent evidence as to each element of the charge to enable a 
jury to find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime," State v. 
Media, 966 P.2d 270,272 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting James. 819 P.2d at 784). 
In the instant matter, the state failed to present evidence sufficient to establish the 
charges. As set forth below, the State completely failed to present any evidence to the 
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jury that the Defendant was required to file a Federal Income Tax Return for 1995. As 
will be pointed out if the Defendant is not required to file a Federal Return the Defendant 
is not required to file a State Return. Thus, the requirement to file a Federal Return is an 
element of the crime that must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
THE STATE WAS REQUIRED TO ESTABLISH THAT THE DEFENDANT 
WAS REQUIRED TO FILE A FEDERAL INCOME TAX RETURN FOR 
1995. 
Many, including attorneys and judges, believe that the Utah income tax scheme is 
just patterned after the Federal income tax scheme and that there is just a minimum of 
nexus between the two. In this they error. The Utah State income tax scheme is more 
than patterned after the Federal income tax scheme. It is wholly dependant on the Federal 
income tax scheme to the extent that the Utah income tax scheme is part and parcel of the 
Federal income tax scheme. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-10-102; 59-10-103; 59-10-111; 
59-10-112; 59-10-117; 59-10-122; 59-10-201.1; 59-10-502. 
Persons required to file returns. An income tax return with respect to the tax im-
posed by this chapter shall be filed by: (1) every resident individual, estate, or trust 
required to file a federal income tax return for the taxable year. Utah Code 59-10-502 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, pursuant to statute the requirement to file a federal income tax return 
becomes an element of the crime which must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt. 
It is well settled that in all criminal trials the requirement to file an income tax 
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return is an issue of fact and must be decided by a trier of fact. Thus the State was 
required to make a presentment of evidence sufficient to establish beyond a reasonable 
doubt that a federal trier of fact had determined that the Defendant had requirement to file 
a federal income tax return for the year 1995. A full marshaling of all of the evidence and 
testimony reveals that the State presented no such evidence of any kind. The State did not 
even make a presentment of evidence and/or testimony that could be considered 
circumstantial and/or sufficient to infer that a federal trier of fact had determined that the 
Defendant had requirement to file a federal income tax return for the year 1995. In fact 
both the State and the Court skirted the issue of a federal filing requirement in it entirety. 
There jury cannot be expected to bridge gaps in the evidence and make assump-
tions based on evidence and testimony that was not given and that is not before them. 
Based on the preceding paragraph the state must present some evidence that a 
federal trier of fact has made a determination that the Defendant had a requirement to file 
a federal income tax return. 
Wherefore, the State having not proven the element of a federal filing requirement 
and the verdict being based solely on remote or speculative possibilities of guilt, the 
charge must be dismissed. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Smith respectfully requests that this Court enter an 
order reversing and remanding this case for further proceedings as appropriate. 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THOMAS HOWARD SMITH, 
Defendant 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 991920225 FS 
Judge: RAYMOND S. UNO 
Date: September 7, 2001 
PRESENT 
Clerk: marcyt 
Prosecutor: MARK W BAER 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attorney(s): RONALD S FUJINO 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: January 16, 1943 
Video 
Tape Number: 1:08 
CHARGES 
1. TAX EVASION - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Guilty - Disposition: 04/11/2001 (Guilty Plea} 
2. TAX EVASION - 2nd Degree Felony 
P l e a : G u i l t y - D i s p o s i t i o n : 0 4 / 1 1 / 2 0 0 1 { G u i l t y P l e a } 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of TAX EVASION a 3 r d Degree 
Fe lony , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o an i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m of no t 
t o e x c e e d f i v e y e a r s i n t h e U t a h S t a t e P r i s o n . 
The p r i s o n te rm i s s u s p e n d e d . 
Based on t h e d e f e n d a n t ' s c o n v i c t i o n of TAX EVASION a 2nd Degree 
Fe lony , t h e d e f e n d a n t i s s e n t e n c e d t o an i n d e t e r m i n a t e t e r m of no t 
l e s s t h a n one y e a r n o r more t h a n f i f t e e n y e a r s i n t h e U t a h S t a t e 
P r i s o n . 
The prison term is suspended. 
D a r t o 1 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
Counts are to run concurrent. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $1000.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $459.46 
Due: $1000.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: $2500.00 
Suspended: $0.00 
Surcharge: $1148.65 
Due: $2500.00 
Total Fine: $3500.00 
Total Suspended: $0 
Total Surcharge: $1608.11 
Total Principal Due: $3500.00 
Plus Interest 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 36 month(s) . 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 3500.00 which includes the surcharge. 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
Usual and ordinary conditions required by the Department of Adult 
Probation & Parole. 
Defendant is to cooperate with the Tax Commission and file returns 
for all years requested. 
Defendant is to make any future tax filings. 
Defendant is to complete 500 hours community service doing service 
approved by APPD. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of $3500 which includes the surcharge. 
Paoe 2 
Case No: 991920225 
Date: Sep 07, 2001 
A review hearing is set for March 15, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. 
Defendant is to keep the State informed of his address at all 
times. 
REVIEW HEARING is scheduled. 
Date: 03/15/2002 
Time: 08:30 a.m. 
Location: Third Floor - W37 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
450 SOUTH STATE STREET 
SLC, UT 84111-1860 
Before Judge: MICHAEL K. BURTON 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilit^^^ttw^iidividuals 
needing special accommodations (including auxiliary u^tflmunicative 
aids and services) during this proceeding should call Third 
District Court-Salt Lake at 238-7058 at least three working days 
prior to the proceeding. The general information phone number is 
(801)238-7300. 
ADDENDUM B 
V y-
y 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Thomas Smith, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
'" -• .
l
 'KsQtitt 
ORDER 
Case No. 20010817-CA 
This matter is before the court on a motion to allow 
Appellant to file his own pro se brief in addition to, and 
separate from, the brief filed on his behalf by his counsel of 
record, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association (LDA) . 
As Appellant's counsel of record in this court, LDA is 
obligated to be an active advocate in behalf the client and 
support the client's appeal to the best of its ability. See 
State v. Wells, 2000 UT App 304, \4, 13 P.3d 1056 (citing State 
v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168, 169 (Utah 1981)). If Appellant wishes 
to raise issues that LDA believes are meritless or otherwise 
unsupported, LDA should incorporate those issues into its brief 
under the guidelines of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) 
and State v. Clayton, 639 P.2d 168 (Utah 1981). This procedure 
allows the court to fully evaluate all of Appellant's issues on 
appeal in the most effective and efficient format. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to allow Appellant to 
file his own pro se brief is denied. 
DATED this 2H day of April, 2002. 
FOR THE COURT: 
ADDENDUM C 
76-8-1101. Operating without tax license — Tax evasion — 
Statute of limitations. 
(1) As provided in Section 59-1-401: 
(a) Any person who is required by Title 59 or any laws the State Tax 
Commission administers or regulates to register with or obtain a license or 
permit from the State Tax Commission, or who operates without having 
registered or secured a license or permit, or who operates when the 
registration, license, or permit is expired or not current, is guilty of a class 
B misdemeanor, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is 
not less than $500 nor more than $1,000. 
(b) Any person who, with intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 
59 or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, fails to make, 
render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any information within the 
time required under this title, or who makes, renders, signs, or verifies any 
false or fraudulent return or statement, or who supplies any false or 
fraudulent information, is guilty of a third degree felony, except that, 
notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, the fine is not less than $1,000 nor 
more than $5,000. 
(c) Any person who willfully attempts to evade or defeat any tax or the 
payment thereof is, in addition to other penalties provided by law, guilty 
of a second degree felony, except that, notwithstanding Section 76-3-301, 
the fine is not less than $1,500 nor more than $25,000. 
(2) The statute of limitations for prosecution for a violation of this section is 
six years from the date the tax should have been remitted. 
59-10-502. Persons required to file returns. 
An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall 
be filed by: 
(1) every resident individual, estate, or trust required to file a federal 
income tax return for the taxable year; and 
(2) every nonresident individual, estate, or trust having federal gross 
income derived from sources within the state for the taxable year and 
required to file a federal income tax return for such taxable year. 
76-1-402. Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode — Included offenses. 
(1) A defendant may be prosecuted in a single criminal action for all 
separate offenses arising out of a single criminal episode; however, when the 
same act of a defendant under a single criminal episode shall establish offenses 
which may be punished in different ways under different provisions of this 
code, the act shall be punishable under only one such provision; an acquittal or 
conviction and sentence under any such provision bars a prosecution under 
any other such provision. 
(2) Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single 
criminal episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a 
defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when: 
(a) The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single court; and 
(b) The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the 
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment. 
(3) A defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense 
charged but may not be convicted of both the offense charged and the included 
offense. An offense is so included when: 
(a) It is established by proof of the same or less than all the facts 
required to establish the commission of the offense charged; or 
(b) It constitutes an attempt, solicitation, conspiracy, or form of prepa-
ration to commit the offense charged or an offense otherwise included 
therein; or 
(c) It is specifically designated by a statute as a lesser included offense. 
(4) The court shall not be obligated to charge the jury with respect to an 
included offense unless there is a rational basis for a verdict acquitting the 
defendant of the offense charged and convicting him of the included offense. 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or judgment, or an appellate 
court on appeal or certiorari, shall determine that there is insufficient evidence 
to support a conviction for the offense charged but that there is sufficient 
evidence to support a conviction for an included offense and the trier of fact 
necessarily found every fact required for conviction of that included offense, 
the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set aside or reversed and a 
judgment of conviction entered for the included offense, without necessity of a 
new trial, if such relief is sought by the defendant. 
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111 S.Ct. 604 
112 L.Ed.2d 617, 59 USLW 4049,67 A.F.T.R.2d 91-344, 91-1 USTC P 50,012 
(Cite as: 498 U.S. 192, 111 S.Ct. 604) 
^ Justice Souter did not participate. 
Supreme Court of the United States 
Opinion on remand, 931 F.2d 1206. 
John L. CHEEK, Petitioner, 
v. 
UNITED STATES.
 W e s t Headnotes 
No. 89-658. 
Argued Oct. 3, 1990. 
Decided Jan. 8, 1991. 
Defendant was convicted in the United 
States District Court for the Northern 
District of Illinois, Paul E. Plunkett, J., of 
attempting to evade income taxes and 
failing to file income tax returns, and he 
appealed. The Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit affirmed, 882 F.2d 1263. 
The United States Supreme Court, Justice 
White, held that: (1) defendant was not 
entitled to acquittal based on good-faith 
belief that income tax law was 
unconstitutional as applied to him and thus 
did not legally impose any duty on him, 
but (2) defendant's good-faith belief that 
the tax laws did not impose any duty on 
him did not have to be objectively 
reasonable in order to be considered by the 
jury. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Justice Scalia, filed an opinion concurring 
in the judgment. 
Justice Blackmun filed a dissenting 
opinion in which Justice Marshall joined. 
HI Criminal Law ^ 3 1 3 
110k313 Most Cited Cases 
Based on the notion that the law is definite 
and knowable, common law presumed that 
every person knew the law. 
HI Internal Revenue ^5263.35 
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases 
"Willfulness" for purposes of criminal tax 
laws requires the Government to prove 
that the law imposed a duty on the 
defendant, that the defendant knew of the 
duty, and that he voluntarily and 
intentionally violated that duty. 26 
U.S.C.A. $S 7201. 7203. 
|31 Criminal Law °^20 
110k20 Most Cited Cases 
Where issue is whether defendant knew of 
duty purportedly imposed by statute or 
regulation he is accused of violating, if 
Government proves actual knowledge of 
the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, 
without more, has satisfied the knowledge 
component of the willfulness requirement. 
| £ Internal Revenue e=:>5300 
220k5300 Most Cited Cases 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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Government has not proved that defendant 
was aware of the duty imposed by the tax 
law which he is accused of willfully 
disobeying if the jury credits a good- faith 
misunderstanding and belief submission, 
whether or not the claimed belief or 
misunderstanding is objectively 
reasonable. 26U.S.C.A. S§ 7201.7203, 
[5] Internal Revenue ^^5263.35 
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's claimed good-faith belief need 
not be objectively reasonable in order for 
it to negate Government's evidence 
purporting to show defendant's awareness 
of his duties under the tax laws. 26 
U.S.C.A. S§ 720L 7203. 
I£ Constitutional Law e ^38 
92k38 Most Cited Cases 
Where possible, court interprets 
congressional enactments so as to avoid 
raising serious constitutional questions. 
iH Internal Revenue e==>5317 
220k5317 Most Cited Cases 
It was error to instruct the jury to disregard 
evidence of defendant's understanding 
that, within meaning of the tax laws, he 
was not person required to file a return or 
to pay income taxes and that wages are not 
taxable income, as incredible as those 
misunderstandings of and beliefs about the 
tax law might be. 26 U.S.C.A. SS 7201. 
7203. 
[81 Internal Revenue €>3;>5263.35 
220k5263.35 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's good-faith belief that income 
tax law was unconstitutional as applied to 
him did not provide defense to charges of 
willfully attempting to evade income taxes 
and failing to file income tax returns, 
notwithstanding claim that, because of his 
belief in the unconstitutionality of the tax 
laws as applied to him, the income tax 
laws could not legally impose any duty 
upon him of which he should have been 
aware. 26U.S.C.A. SS 720L 7203. 
**605 Syllabus SEN?} 
FN* The syllabus constitutes no 
part of the opinion of the Court but 
has been prepared by the Reporter 
of Decisions for the convenience of 
the reader. See United States v. 
Detroit Lumber Co.. 200 U.S. 32L 
337, 26 S.Ct. 282. 287, 50 L.Ed. 
499. 
Petitioner Cheek was charged with six 
counts of willfully failing to file a federal 
income tax return in violation of§7203of 
the Internal Revenue Code (Code) and 
three counts of willfully attempting to 
evade his income taxes in violation of § 
7201. Although adm itting that he had not 
filed his returns, he testified that he had 
not acted willfully because he sincerely 
believed, based on his indoctrination by a 
group believing that the federal tax system 
is unconstitutional and his own study, that 
the tax laws were being unconstitutionally 
enforced and that his actions were lawful. 
In instructing the jury, the court stated that 
an honest but unreasonable belief is not a 
defense and does not negate willfulness, 
and that Cheek's beliefs that wages are not 
income and that he was not a taxpayer 
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within the meaning of the Code were not 
objectively reasonable. It also instructed 
the jury that a personfs opinion that the tax 
laws violate his constitutional rights does 
not c o n s t i t u t e a good-fai th 
misunderstanding of the law. Cheek was 
convicted, and the Court of Appeals 
affirmed. 
Held: 
1. A good-faith misunderstanding of the 
law or a good-faith belief that one is not 
violating the law negates willfulness, 
whether or not the claimed belief or 
misunderstanding is objectively 
reasonable. Statutory willfulness, which 
protects the average citizen from 
prosecution for innocent mistakes made 
due to the complexity of the tax laws, 
United States v. Murdoch 290 U.S. 389. 
54 S.Ct. 223, 78 L.Ed. 381. is the 
voluntary, intentional violation of a known 
legal duty. United States v. Pomponio. 
429 U.S. 10. 97 S.Ct. 22. 50 L.Ed.2d 12. 
Thus, if the jury credited Cheeks assertion 
that he truly believed that the Code did not 
treat wages as income, the Government 
would not have carried its burden to prove 
willfulness, however unreasonable a court 
might deem such a belief. Characterizing 
a belief as objectively unreasonable* *606 
transforms what is normally a factual 
inquiry into a legal one, thus preventing a 
jury from considering it. And forbidding 
a jury to consider evidence that might 
negate willfulness would raise a serious 
question under the Sixth Amendment's 
jury trial provision, which this 
interpretation of the statute avoids. Of 
course, in deciding whether to credit 
Cheek's claim, the jury is free to consider 
any admissible evidence showing that he 
had knowledge of his legal duties. Pp. 
609-612. 
*193 2. It was proper for the trial court to 
instruct the jury not to consider Cheek's 
claim that the tax laws are 
unconstitutional, since a defendant's views 
about the tax statutes' validity are 
irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and 
should not be heard by a jury. Unlike the 
claims in the Murdock-Pomponio line of 
cases, claims that Code provisions are 
unconstitutional do not arise from innocent 
mistakes caused by the Code's complexity. 
Rather, they reveal full knowledge of the 
provisions at issue and a studied 
conclusion that those provisions are 
invalid and unenforceable. Congress could 
not have contemplated that a taxpayer, 
without risking criminal prosecution, could 
ignore his duties under the Code and 
refuse to utilize the mechanisms Congress 
provided to present his invalidity claims to 
the courts and to abide by their decisions. 
Cheek was free to pay the tax, file for a 
refund, and, if denied, present his claims to 
the courts. Also, without paying the tax, 
he could have challenged claims of tax 
deficiencies in the Tax Court. Pp. 
612-613. 
882 F.2d 1263, fCA7 1989^ vacated and 
remanded. 
WHITE, J., delivered the opinion of the 
Court, in which REHNQUIST, C.J., and 
STEVENS, O'CONNOR, and KENNEDY, 
JJ., joined. SCALIA, J., filed an opinion 
concurring in the judgment, post, p. 613. 
BLACKMUN, J., filed a dissenting 
opinion, in which MARSHALL, J., joined, 
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post, p. 614. SOUTER, J., took no part in 
the consideration or decision of the case. 
William R. Coulson argued the cause for 
petitioner. With him on the briefs was 
Susan M. Keegan. 
Edwin S. Kneedler argued the cause for 
the United States. With him on the brief 
were Solicitor General Starr, Assistant 
Attorney General Peterson, Deputy 
Solicitor General Bryson, Robert E. 
Lindsay, and Alan Hechtkopf 
Justice WHITE delivered the opinion of 
the Court. 
Title 26, S 7201 of the United States Code 
provides that any person "who willfully 
attempts in any manner to evade or defeat 
any tax imposed by this title or the 
payment thereof1 shall be guilty of a 
felony. Under 26 U.S.C. 6 7203. "[a]nv 
person required under this title ... or by 
regulations made under authority thereof 
to make a return... who willfully fails to... 
make such return" shall be guilty of a 
misdemeanor. *194 This case turns on 
the meaning of the word "willfully" as 
used in SS 7201 and 7203. 
I 
Petitioner John L. Cheek has been a pilot 
for American Airlines since 1973. He filed 
federal income tax returns through 1979 
but thereafter ceased to file returns. [FN1] 
He also claimed an increasing number of 
withholding allowances—eventually 
claiming 60 allowances by mid-1980—and 
for the years 1981 to 1984 indicated on his 
W-4 forms that he was exempt from 
federal income taxes. In 1983, petitioner 
unsuccessfully sought a refund of all tax 
withheld by his employer in 1982. 
Petitioner's income during this period at all 
times far exceeded the minimum necessary 
to trigger the statutory filing requirement. 
FN1. Cheek did file what the Court 
of Appeals described as a frivolous 
return in 1982. 
As a result of his activities, petitioner was 
indicted for 10 violations of federal law. 
He was charged with six counts of 
willfully failing to file a federal income tax 
return for the years 1980, 1981, and 1983 
through 1986, in violation of $7203. He 
was further charged with three counts of 
willfully attempting to **607 evade his 
income taxes for the years 1980,1981, and 
1983 in violation of 26 U.S.C. S 7201. In 
those years, American Airlines withheld 
substantially less than the amount of tax 
petitioner owed because of the numerous 
allowances and exempt status he claimed 
on his W-4 forms. [FN2] The tax 
offenses with which petitioner was 
charged are specific intent crimes that 
require the defendant to have acted 
willfully. 
FN2. Because petitioner filed a 
refund claim for the entire amount 
withheld by his employer in 1982, 
petitioner was also charged under 
18 U.S.C. $287 with one count of 
presenting a claim to an agency of 
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the United States knowing the 
claim to be false and fraudulent. 
At trial, the evidence established that 
between 1982 and 1986, petitioner was 
involved in at least four civil cases that 
*195 challenged various aspects of the 
federal income tax system. [FN3] In all 
four of those cases, the plaintiffs were 
informed by the courts that many of their 
arguments, including that they were not 
taxpayers within the meaning of the tax 
laws, that wages are not income, that the 
Sixteenth Amendment does not authorize 
the imposition of an income tax on 
individuals, and that the Sixteenth 
Amendment is unenforceable, were 
frivolous or had been repeatedly rejected 
by the courts. During this time period, 
petitioner also attended at least two 
criminal trials of persons charged with tax 
offenses. In addition, there was evidence 
that in 1980 or 1981 an attorney had 
advised Cheek that the courts had rejected 
as frivolous the claim that wages are not 
income. [FN4] 
FN3. In March 1982, Cheek and 
another employee of the company 
sued American Airlines to 
challenge the withholding of 
federal income taxes. In April 
1982, Cheek sued the Internal 
Revenue Service (IRS) in the 
United States Tax Court, asserting 
that he was not a taxpayer or a 
person for purposes of the Internal 
Revenue Code and that his wages 
were not income, and making 
several other related claims. 
Cheek and four others also filed an 
action against the United States and 
the Commissioner of Internal 
Revenue in Federal District Court, 
claiming that withholding taxes 
from their wages violated the 
Sixteenth Amendment. Finally, in 
1985 Cheek filed claims with the 
IRS seeking to have refunded the 
taxes withheld from his wages in 
1983 and 1984. When these 
claims were not allowed, he 
brought suit in the District Court 
claiming that the withholding was 
an unconstitutional taking of his 
property and that his wages were 
not income. In dismissing this 
action as frivolous, the District 
Court imposed costs and attorneys 
fees of $ 1,500 and a sanction under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 
in the amount of $10,000. The 
Court of Appeals agreed that 
Cheek's claims were frivolous, 
reduced the District Court sanction 
to $5,000, and imposed an 
additional sanction of $1,500 for 
bringing a frivolous appeal. 
FN4. The attorney also advised that 
despite the Fifth Amendment, the 
filing of a tax return was required 
and that a person could challenge 
the constitutionality of the system 
by suing for a refund after the taxes 
had been withheld, or by putting 
himself "at risk of criminal 
prosecution." 
Cheek represented himself at trial and 
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testified in his defense. He admitted that 
he had not filed personal income tax 
returns during the years in question. He 
testified that as early as 1978, he had 
begun attending seminars sponsored *196 
by, and following the advice of, a group 
that believes, among other things, that the 
federal tax system is unconstitutional. 
Some of the speakers at these meetings 
were lawyers who purported to give 
professional opinions about the invalidity 
of the federal income tax laws. Cheek 
produced a letter from an attorney stating 
that the Sixteenth Amendment did not 
authorize a tax on wages and salaries but 
only on gain or profit. Petitioner's defense 
was that, based on the indoctrination he 
received from this group and from his own 
study, he sincerely believed that the tax 
laws were being unconstitutionally 
enforced and that his actions during the 
1980-1986 period were lawful. He 
therefore argued that he had acted without 
the willfulness required for conviction of 
the various offenses with which he was 
charged. 
In the course of its instructions, the trial 
court advised the jury that to prove 
"willfulness" the Government must prove 
the voluntary and intentional violation of a 
known legal duty, a burden that could not 
be proved by showing mistake, ignorance, 
or negligence. **608 The court further 
advised the jury that an objectively 
reasonable good-faith misunderstanding of 
the law would negate willfulness, but mere 
disagreement with the law would not. 
The court described Cheek's beliefs about 
the income tax system [FN5] and 
instructed the jury that if it found that 
Cheek "honestly and reasonably believed 
that *197 he was not required to pay 
income taxes or to file tax returns," App. 
81, a not guilty verdict should be returned. 
FN5. "The defendant has testified 
as to what he states are his 
interpretations of the United States 
Constitution, court opinions, 
common law atnd other materials he 
has reviewed.... He has also 
introduced materials which contain 
references to quotations from the 
United States Constitution, court 
opinions, statutes, and other 
sources. 
"He testified he relied on his 
interpretations and on these 
materials in concluding that he was 
not a person required to file income 
tax returns for the year or years 
charged, was not required to pay 
income taxes and that he could 
claim exempt status on his W-4 
forms, and that he could claim 
refunds of all moneys withheld." 
App. 75-76. 
"Among other things, Mr. Cheek 
contends that his wages from a 
private employer, American 
Airlines, does [sic ] not constitute 
income under the Internal Revenue 
Service laws." Id, at 81. 
After several hours of deliberation, the 
jury sent a note to the judge that stated in 
part: 
" 'We have a basic disagreement between 
some of us as to if Mr. Cheek honestly & 
reasonably believed that he was not 
required to pay income taxes. 
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 'Page 32 [the relevant jury instruction] 
discusses good faith misunderstanding & 
disagreement. Is there any additional 
clarification you can give us on this 
point?1" Id, at 85. 
The District Judge responded with a 
supplemental instruction containing the 
following statements: 
"[A] person's opinion that the tax laws 
violate his constitutional rights does not 
constitute a good faith misunderstanding 
of the law. Furthermore, a person's 
disagreement with the government's tax 
collection systems and policies does not 
constitute a good faith misunderstanding 
of the law." Id, at 86. 
At the end of the first day of deliberation, 
the jury sent out another note saying that it 
still could not reach a verdict because " 
'[w]e are divided on the issue as to if Mr. 
Cheek honestly & reasonably believed that 
he was not required to pay income tax.'" 
Id, at 87. When the jury resumed its 
deliberations, the District Judge gave the 
jury an additional instruction. This 
instruction stated in part that f,[a]n honest 
but unreasonable belief is not a defense 
and does not negate willfulness," id, at 88, 
and that "[a]dvice or research resulting in 
the conclusion that wages of a privately 
employed person are not income or that the 
tax laws are unconstitutional is not 
objectively reasonable and cannot serve as 
the basis for a good faith misunderstanding 
of the law defense." Ibid. The court also 
instructed the jury that "[pjersistent refusal 
to acknowledge the law does not constitute 
a good *198 faith misunderstanding of the 
law." Ibid. Approximately two hours 
later, the jury returned a verdict finding 
petitioner guilty on all counts. [FN6] 
FN6. A note signed by all 12 jurors 
also informed the judge that 
although the jury found petitioner 
guilty, several jurors wanted to 
express their personal opinions of 
the case and that notes from these 
individual jurors to the court were 
"a complaint against the narrow & 
hard expression under the 
constraints of the law." Id., at 90. 
At least two notes from individual 
jurors expressed the opinion that 
petitioner sincerely believed in his 
cause even though his beliefs might 
have been unreasonable. 
Petitioner appealed his convictions, 
arguing that the District Court erred by 
instructing the jury that only an objectively 
reasonable misunderstanding of the law 
negates the statutory willfulness 
requirement. The United States Court of 
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit rejected 
that contention and affirmed the 
convictions. 882 F.2d 1263 (1989). In 
prior cases, the Seventh Circuit had made 
clear that good-faith misunderstanding of 
the law negates willfulness only if the 
defendant's **609 beliefs are objectively 
reasonable; in the Seventh Circuit, even 
actual ignorance is not a defense unless the 
defendant's ignorance was itself 
objectively reasonable. See, e.g., United 
States v. Buckner. 830 F.2d 102 (1987V 
In its opinion in this case, the court noted 
that several specified beliefs, including the 
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beliefs that the tax laws are 
unconstitutional and that wages are not 
income, would not be objectively 
reasonable.JTN7] Because the Seventh 
Circuit's *199 interpretation of "willfully" 
as used in these statutes conflicts with the 
decisions of several other Courts of 
Appeals, see, e.g., United States v. 
Whiteside. 810 F.2d 1306, 1310-1311 
(CA5 1987): United States v. Phillips. 
775 F.2d 262. 263-264 (CAIO 1985): 
United States v. Aitken. 755 F.2d 188. 
191-193 fCAl 1985). we granted 
certiorari, 493 U.S. 1068.110 S.Ct. 1108. 
107 L.Ed.2d 1016 (1990). 
return violates the privilege against 
self-incriminaition; and 
"(7) the belief that Federal Reserve 
Notes do not constitute cash or 
income. 
"Miller v. United States. 868 F.2d 
236. 239-41 (7th Cir.1989): 
Buckner. 830 F.2d at 102: United 
States v. Dube. 820 F.2d 886. 891 
(7th Cir.1987): Coleman v. 
Comm'r. 791 F.2d 68. 70-71 (7th 
Cir.1986): Moore. 627 F.2d at 833. 
We have no doubt that this list will 
increase with time." 
FN7. The opinion stated, 882 F.2d 
1263.1268-1269. n. 2 (CA7 1989). 
as follows: 
"For the record, we note that the 
following beliefs, which are stock 
arguments of the tax protester 
movement, have not been, nor ever 
will be, considered 'objectively 
reasonable1 in this circuit: "(1) the 
belief that the sixteenth amendment 
to the constitution was improperly 
ratified and therefore never came 
into being; 
"(2) the belief that the sixteenth 
amendment is unconstitutional 
generally; 
"(3) the belief that the income tax 
violates the takings clause of the 
fifth amendment; 
"(4) the belief that the tax laws are 
unconstitutional; 
"(5) the belief that wages are not 
income and therefore are not 
subject to federal income tax laws; 
"(6) the belief that filing a tax 
II 
[1] The general rule that ignorance of the 
law or a mistake of law is no defense to 
criminal prosecution is deeply rooted in 
the American legal system. See, e.g., 
United States v. Smith. 5 Wheat 153.182. 
5 L.Ed. 57 (1820) (Livingston, J., 
dissenting); Barlow v. United States. 1 
Pet. 404. 411. 8 L.Ed. 728 (1833): 
Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145. 
167. 25 L.Ed. 244 ( 1 8 7 9 ) : 
Shevlin-Carpenter Co. v. Minnesota. 218 
U.S. 57. 68. 30 S.Ct. 663. 666. 54 L.Ed. 
930 (1910V Lambert v. California. 355 
U.S. 225. 228. 78 S.Ct. 240. 242. 2 
L.Ed.2d 228 (1957): Liparota v. United 
States. All U.S. 419.441.105 S.Ct 2084. 
2096. 85 L.Ed.2d 434 (1985) (WHITE, J., 
dissenting); O. Holmes, The Common 
Law 47-48 (1881). Based on the notion 
that the law is definite and knowable, the 
common law presumed that every person 
knew the law. This common-law rule has 
been applied by the Court in numerous 
cases construing criminal statutes. See, 
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e.g., United States v. International 
Minerals & Chemical Corp.. 402 U.S. 
558. 91 S.Ct. 1697. 29 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1971): Hamling v. United States. 418 
U.S. 87. 119424. 94 S.Ct. 2887. 
2808-2911.41 L.Ed.2d 590 (1974): Bovce 
Motor Lines. Inc. v. United States. 342 
U.S. 337. 72 S.Ct. 329. 96 L.Ed. 367 
(1952). 
The proliferation of statutes and 
regulations has sometimes made it difficult 
for the average citizen to know and 
comprehend *200 the extent of the duties 
and obligations imposed by the tax laws. 
Congress has accordingly softened the 
impact of the common-law presumption by 
making specific intent to violate the law an 
element of certain federal criminal tax 
offenses. Thus, the Court almost 60 years 
ago interpreted the statutory term 
"willfully" as used in the federal criminal 
tax statutes as carving out an exception to 
the traditional rule. This special treatment 
of criminal tax offenses is largely due to 
the complexity of the tax laws. In United 
States v. Murdoch. 290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct. 
223. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933). the Court 
recognized that: 
"Congress did not intend that a person, 
by reason of a bona fide 
misunderstanding as **610 to his 
liability for the tax, as to his duty to 
make a return, or as to the adequacy of 
the records he maintained, should 
become a criminal by his mere failure to 
measure up to the prescribed standard of 
conduct." Id. at 396. 54 S.Ct.. at 226. 
The Court held that the defendant was 
entitled to an instruction with respect to 
whether he acted in good faith based on 
his actual belief. In Murdoch, the Court 
interpreted the term "willfully" as used in 
the criminal tax statutes generally to mean 
"an act done with a bad purpose," id., at 
394. 54 S.Ct. at 225. or with "an evil 
motive," id. at 395. 54 S.Ct. at 225. 
Subsequent decisions have refined this 
proposition. In United States v. Bishop. 
412 U.S. 346. 93 S.Ct. 2008. 36 L.Ed.2d 
941 (1973). we described the term 
"willfully" as connoting "a voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal 
duty," id. at 360. 93 S.Ct. at 2017. and 
did so with specific reference to the "bad 
faith or evil intent" language employed in 
Murdoch. Still later, United States v. 
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 97 S.Ct. 22. 50 
L.Ed.2d 12 (1976) (per curiam ), 
addressed a situation in which several 
defendants had been charged with willfully 
filing false tax returns. The jury was 
given an instruction on willfulness similar 
to the standard set forth in Bishop. In 
addition, it was instructed that " f[g]ood 
motive alone is never a defense where the 
act done or omitted is a crime.1" Id. at 11. 
97 S.Ct. at 23. The defendants were 
convicted but the Court of Appeals 
reversed, concluding that the latter 
instruction *201 was improper because the 
statute required a finding of bad purpose 
or evil motive. Ibid. 
We reversed the Court of Appeals, stating 
that "the Court of Appeals incorrectly 
assumed that the reference to an fevil 
motive1 in United States v. Bishop, supra. 
and prior cases," ibid., "requires proof of 
any motive other than an intentional 
violation of a known legal duty." Id., at 
12. 97 S.Ct. at 23. As "the other Courts 
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of Appeals that have considered the 
question have recognized, willfulness in 
this context simply means a voluntary, 
intentional violation of a known legal 
duty." Ibid We concluded that after 
instructing the jury on willfulness, "[a]n 
additional instruction on good faith was 
unnecessary." Id. at 13.97 S.Ct. at 24. 
Taken together, Bishop and Pomponio 
conclusively establish that the standard for 
the statutory willfulness requirement is the 
"voluntary, intentional violation of a 
known legal duty." 
Ill 
Cheek accepts the Pomponio definition of 
willfulness, Brief for Petitioner 5, and n. 4, 
13,36; Reply Brief for Petitioner 4, 6-7, 
11, 13, but asserts that the District Court's 
instructions and the Court of Appeals1 
opinion departed from that definition. In 
particular, he challenges the ruling that a 
good-faith misunderstanding of the law or 
a good-faith belief that one is not violating 
the law, if it is to negate willfulness, must 
be objectively reasonable. We agree that 
the Court of Appeals and the District Court 
erred in this respect. 
A 
[2] [3] [4] Willfulness, as construed by our 
prior decisions in criminal tax cases, 
requires the Government to prove that the 
law imposed a duty on the defendant, that 
the defendant knew of this duty, and that 
he voluntarily and intentionally violated 
that duty. We deal first with the case 
where the issue is whether the defendant 
knew of the duty purportedly imposed by 
the provision of the statute or regulation he 
is accused of violating, a case in which 
there is no claim that the provision *202 at 
issue is invalid. In such a case, if the 
Government proves actual knowledge of 
the pertinent legal duty, the prosecution, 
without more, has satisfied the knowledge 
component of the willfulness requirement. 
But carrying this burden requires negating 
a defendant's claim of ignorance of the law 
or a claim that because of a 
misunderstanding of the law, he had a 
good-faith belief that he was not violating 
any of the provisions of the tax laws. This 
is so **611 because one cannot be aware 
that the law imposes a duty upon him and 
yet be ignorant of it, misunderstand the 
law, or believe that the duty does not exist. 
In the end, the issue is whether, based on 
all the evidence, the Government has 
proved that the defendant was aware of the 
duty at issue, which cannot be true if the 
jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding 
and belief submission, whether or not the 
claimed belief or misunderstanding is 
objectively reasonable. 
In this case, if Cheek asserted that he truly 
believed that the Internal Revenue Code 
did not purport to treat wages as income, 
and the jury believed him, the Government 
would not have carried its burden to prove 
willfulness, however unreasonable a court 
might deem such a belief. Of course, in 
deciding whether to credit Cheek's 
good-faith belief claim, the jury would be 
free to consider any admissible evidence 
from any source showing that Cheek was 
aware of his duty to file a return and to 
treat wages as income, including evidence 
showing his awareness of the relevant 
provisions of the Code or regulations, of 
court decisions rejecting his interpretation 
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of the tax law, of authoritative rulings of 
the Internal Revenue Service, or of any 
contents of the personal income tax return 
forms and accompanying instructions that 
made it plain that wages should be 
returned as income.JTN8] 
FN8. Cheek recognizes that a 
"defendant who knows what the 
law is and who disagrees with it... 
does not have a bona fide 
misunderstanding defense," but 
asserts that "a defendant who has a 
bona fide misunderstanding of [the 
law] does not 'know1 his legal duty 
and lacks willfulness." Brief for 
Petitioner 29, and n. 13. The 
Reply Brief for Petitioner, at 13, 
states: "We are in no way 
suggesting that Cheek or anyone 
else is immune from criminal 
prosecution if he knows what the 
law is, but believes it should be 
otherwise, and therefore violates 
it." See also Tr. of Oral Arg. 9,11, 
12,15,17. 
[5][6] *203 We thus disagree with the 
Court of Appeals1 requirement that a 
claimed good-faith belief must be 
objectively reasonable if it is to be 
considered as possibly negating the 
Government's evidence purporting to show 
a defendant's awareness of the legal duty at 
issue. Knowledge and belief are 
characteristically questions for the 
factfinder, in this case the jury. 
Characterizing a particular belief as not 
objectively reasonable transforms the 
inquiry into a legal one and would prevent 
the jury from considering it. It would of 
course be proper to exclude evidence 
having no relevance or probative value 
with respect to willfulness; but it is not 
contrary to common sense, let alone 
impossible, for a defendant to be ignorant 
of his duty based on an irrational belief 
that he has no duty, and forbidding the jury 
to consider evidence that might negate 
willfulness would raise a serious question 
under the Sixth Amendment's jury trial 
provision. Cf. Francis v. Franklin. 471 
U.S. 307.105 S.Ct. 1965. 85 L.Ed.2d 344 
(1985V, Sandstrom v. Montana. 442 U.S. 
510.99 S.Ct 2450.61 L.Ed.2d 39 (1979): 
Morissette v. United States. 342 U.S. 246, 
72 S.Ct. 240. 96 L.Ed. 288 (19521 It is 
common ground that this Court, where 
possible, interprets congressional 
enactments so as to avoid raising serious 
constitutional questions. See, e.g., 
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida 
Gulf Coast Building & Construction 
Trades Council. 485 U.S. 568. 575, 108 
S.Ct. 1392.1397. 99 L.Ed.2d 645 (1988V 
Crowellv. Benson. 285 U.S. 22.62. andn. 
30. 52 S.Ct 285.296. and n. 30. 76 L.Ed. 
598(1932): Public Citizen v. Department 
of Justice. 491 U.S. 440. 465-466. 109 
S.Ct. 2558. 2572-2573. 105 L.Ed.2d 377 
(1989). 
[7] It was therefore error to instruct the 
jury to disregard evidence of Cheek's 
understanding that, within the meaning of 
the tax laws, he was not a person required 
to file a return or to pay income taxes and 
that wages are not taxable income, as 
incredible as such misunderstandings of 
and beliefs about the law might be. Of 
course, the more unreasonable the 
assertedbeliefs *204 or misunderstandings 
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are, the more likely the jury will consider 
them to be nothing more than simple 
**612 disagreement with known legal 
duties imposed by the tax laws and will 
find that the Government has carried its 
burden of proving knowledge. 
B 
[8] Cheek asserted in the trial court that he 
should be acquitted because he believed in 
good faith that the income tax law is 
unconstitutional as applied to him and thus 
could not legally impose any duty upon 
him of which he should have been aware. 
[FN9] Such a submission is unsound, not 
because *205 Cheek's constitutional 
arguments are not objectively reasonable 
or frivolous, which they surely are, but 
because the Murdock-Pornponio line of 
cases does not support such a position. 
Those cases construed the willfulness 
requirement in the criminal provisions of 
the Internal Revenue Code to require proof 
of knowledge of the law. This was 
because in "our complex tax system, 
uncertainty often arises even among 
taxpayers who earnestly wish to follow the 
law," and " '[i]t is not the purpose of the 
law to penalize frank difference of opinion 
or innocent errors made despite the 
exercise of reasonable care.' " United 
States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 346. 360-361. 
93 S.Ct. 2008.2017-2018.36 L.Ed.2d 941 
(1973^ (quoting Spies v. United States. 317 
U.S. 492.496.63 S.Ct. 364.367.87 L.Ed. 
418X1943)). 
FN9. In his opening and reply 
briefs and at oral argument, Cheek 
asserts that this case does not 
present the issue whether a claim of 
unconstitutionality would serve to 
negate willfulness and that we need 
not address the issue. Brief for 
Petitioner 13; Reply Brief for 
Petitioner 5, 11, 12; Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 6,13. Cheek testified at trial, 
however, that ff[i]t is my belief that 
the law is being enforced 
unconstitutionally." App. 60. He 
also produced a letter from counsel 
advising him that " 'Finally you 
make a valid contention ... that 
Congress1 power to tax comes from 
Article L Section 8. Clause 1 of the 
U.S. Constitution, and not from the 
Sixteenth Amendment and that the 
[latter], construed with Article I. 
Section 2. Clause 3. never 
authorized a tax on wages and 
salaries, but only on gain and 
profit.11 Id, at 57. We note also 
that the jury asked for "the portion 
[of the transcript] wherein Mr. 
Cheek stated he was attempting to 
test the constitutionality of the 
income tax laws," Tr. 1704, and 
that the trial judge later instructed 
the jury that an opinion that the tax 
laws violate a person's 
constitutional rights does not 
cons t i tu te a good-fai th 
misunderstanding of the law. We 
also note that at oral argument 
Cheek's counsel observed that 
"personal belief that a known 
statute is unconstitutional smacks 
of knowledge with existing law, but 
disagreement with it." Tr. of Oral 
Arg. 5. He also opined: 
"If the person believes as a personal 
belief that known—law known to 
them [sic] is unconstitutional, I 
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submit that that would not be a 
defense, because what the person is 
really saying is I know what the law 
is, for constitutional reasons I have 
made my own determination that it 
is invalid. I am not suggesting that 
that is a defense. 
"However, if the person was told by 
a lawyer or by an accountant 
erroneously that the statute is 
unconstitutional, and it's my 
professional advice to you that you 
don't have to follow it, then you 
have got a little different situation. 
This is not that case." Id, at 6. 
Given this posture of the case, we 
perceive no reason not to address 
the significance of Cheek's 
constitutional claims to the issue of 
willfulness. 
Claims that some of the provisions of the 
tax code are unconstitutional are 
submissions of a different order. [FN 10] 
They do not arise from innocent mistakes 
caused by the complexity of the Internal 
Revenue Code. Rather, they reveal full 
knowledge of the provisions at issue and a 
studied conclusion, however wrong, that 
those provisions are invalid **613 and 
unenforceable. *206 Thus in this case, 
Cheek paid his taxes for years, but after 
attending various seminars and based on 
his own study, he concluded that the 
income tax laws could not constitutionally 
require him to pay a tax. 
FN10. In United States v. Murdoch. 
290 U.S. 389. 54 S.Ct. 223. 78 
L.Ed. 381 H933I discussed supra, 
at 609-610, the defendant Murdock 
was summoned to appear before a 
revenue agent for examination. 
Questions were put to him, which 
he refused to answer for fear of 
self-incrimination under state law. 
He was indicted for refusing to 
give testimony and supply 
information contrary to the 
pertinent provisions of the Internal 
Revenue Code. This Court 
affirmed the reversal of Murdock's 
conviction, holding that the trial 
court erred in refusing to give an 
instruction directing the jury to 
consider Murdock's asserted claim 
of a good-faith, actual belief that 
because of the Fifth Amendment he 
was privileged not to answer the 
questions put to him. It is thus the 
case that Murdock's asserted belief 
was grounded in the Constitution, 
but it was a claim of privilege not 
to answer, not a claim that any 
provision of the tax laws were 
unconstitutional, and not a claim 
for which the tax laws provided 
procedures to entertain and resolve. 
Cheek's position at trial, in 
contrast, was that the tax laws were 
unconstitutional as applied to him. 
We do not believe that Congress 
contemplated that such a taxpayer, without 
risking criminal prosecution, could ignore 
the duties imposed upon him by the 
Internal Revenue Code and refuse to 
utilize the mechanisms provided by 
Congress to present his claims of invalidity 
to the courts and to abide by their 
decisions. There is no doubt that Cheek, 
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from year to year, was free to pay the tax 
that the law purported to require, file for a 
refund and, if denied, present his claims of 
invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to 
the courts. See 26 U.S.C. 6 7422. Also, 
without paying the tax, he could have 
challenged claims of tax deficiencies in the 
Tax Court, § 6213, with the right to appeal 
to a higher court if unsuccessful. § 
7482(a)( 1). Cheek took neither course in 
some years, and when he did was 
unwilling to accept the outcome. As we 
see it, he is in no position to claim that his 
good-faith belief about the validity of the 
Internal Revenue Code negates willfulness 
or provides a defense to criminal 
prosecution under ^ 7 2 0 1 and 7203. Of 
course, Cheek was free in this very case to 
present his claims of invalidity and have 
them adjudicated, but like defendants in 
criminal cases in other contexts, who 
"willfully" refuse to comply with the 
duties placed upon them by the law, he 
must take the risk of being wrong. 
We thus hold that in a case like this, a 
defendant's views about the validity of the 
tax statutes are irrelevant to the issue of 
willfulness and need not be heard by the 
jury, and, if they are, an instruction to 
disregard them would be proper. For this 
purpose, it makes no difference whether 
the claims of invalidity are frivolous or 
have substance. It was therefore not error 
in this case for the District Judge to 
instruct the jury not to consider Cheeks 
claims that the tax laws were 
unconstitutional. However, it was error 
for the court to instruct *207 the jury that 
petitioner's asserted beliefs that wages are 
not income and that he was not a taxpayer 
within the meaning of the Internal 
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Revenue Code should not be considered by 
the jury in determining whether Cheek had 
acted willfully .iFNJU 
FN1L Cheek argues that applying 
to him the Court of Appeals1 
s tandard of ob jec t ive 
reasonableness violates his rights 
under the First, Fifth, and Sixth 
Amendments of the Constitution. 
Since we have invalidated the 
challenged standard on statutory 
grounds, we need not address these 
submissions. 
IV 
For the reasons set forth in the opinion 
above, the judgment of the Court of 
Appeals is vacated, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
Justice SOUTER took no part in the 
consideration or decision of this case. 
Justice SCALIA. concurring in the 
judgment. 
I concur in the judgment of the Court 
because our cases have consistently held 
that the failure to pay a tax in the 
good-faith belief that it is not legally 
owing is not "willful" I do not join the 
Court's opinion because I do not agree 
Copr. © West 2002 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 16 
with the test for willfulness that it directs 
the Court of Appeals to apply on remand. 
As the Court acknowledges, our opinions 
from the 1930's to the 1970's have 
interpreted the word "willfully" in the 
criminal tax statutes as requiring the "bad 
purpose" or "evil motive" of 
"intentionally] violating] a known legal 
duty." See, e.g., United States v. 
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12. 97 S.Ct. 22. 
23.50 L.Ed.2d 12(1976): United States v. 
Murdoch. 290 U.S. 389.394-395.54 S.Ct. 
223. 225-226. 78 L.Ed. 381 (1933V It 
seems to me that today's opinion squarely 
reverses that long-established statutory 
construction **614 when it says that a 
good-faith erroneous belief in the 
unconstitutionality of a tax law is no 
defense. It is quite impossible to say that 
a statute which *208 one believes 
unconstitutional represents a "known legal 
duty." See Marburv v. Madison. 1 
Cranch 137. 177-178. 2 L.Ed. 60 (18031 
Although the facts of the present case 
involve erroneous reliance upon the 
Constitution in ignoring the otherwise 
"known legal duty" imposed by the tax 
statutes, the Court's new interpretation 
applies also to erroneous reliance upon a 
tax statute in ignoring the otherwise 
"known legal duty" of a regulation, and to 
erroneous reliance upon a regulation in 
ignoring the otherwise "known legal duty" 
of a tax assessment. These situations as 
well meet the opinion's crucial test of 
"reveal[ing] full knowledge of the 
provisions at issue and a studied 
conclusion, however wrong, that those 
provisions are invalid and unenforceable," 
ante, at 612-613. There is, moreover, no 
rational basis for saying that a "willful" 
violation is established by full knowledge 
of a statutory requirement, but is not 
established by full knowledge of a 
requirement explicitly imposed by 
regulation or order. Thus, today's opinion 
works a revolution in past practice, 
subjecting to criminal penalties taxpayers 
who do not comply with Treasury 
Regulations that are in their view contrary 
to the Internal Revenue Code, Treasury 
Rulings that are in their view contrary to 
the regulations, and even IRS auditor 
pronouncements that are in their view 
contrary to Treasury Rulings. The law 
already provides considerable incentive for 
taxpayers to be careful in ignoring any 
official assertion of tax liability, since it 
contains civil penalties that apply even in 
the event of a good-faith mistake, see, e.g., 
26 U.S.C. SS 6651. 6653. To impose in 
addition criminal penalties for 
misinterpretation of such a complex body 
of law is a startling innovation indeed. 
I find it impossible to understand how one 
can derive from the lonesome word 
"willfully" the proposition that belief in the 
nonexistence of a textual prohibition 
excuses liability, but belief in the invalidity 
{i.e., the legal nonexistence) of a textual 
prohibition does not. One may say, as the 
law does *209 in many contexts, that 
"willfully" refers to consciousness of the 
act but not to consciousness that the act is 
unlawful. See, e.g.. American Surety Co. 
of New York v. Sullivan. 7 F.2d 605. 606 
(CA2 1925^  (L. Hand, J.); cf. United 
States v. International Minerals & 
Chemical Corp.. 402 U.S. 558. 563-565. 
91 S.Ct. 1697.1700-1702.29 L.Ed.2d 178 
(1971). Or alternatively, one may say, as 
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we have said until today with respect to the 
tax statutes, that "willfully" refers to 
consciousness of both the act and its 
illegality. But it seems to me impossible to 
say that the word refers to consciousness 
that some legal text exists, without 
consciousness that that legal text is 
binding, i.e., with the good-faith belief that 
it is not a valid law. Perhaps such a test 
for criminal liability would make sense 
(though in a field as complicated as federal 
tax law, I doubt it), but some text other 
than the mere word "willfully" would have 
to be employed to describe it-and that text 
is not ours to write. 
Because today's opinion abandons clear 
and longstanding precedent to impose 
criminal liability where taxpayers have had 
no reason to expect it, because the new 
contours of criminal liability have no basis 
in the statutory text, and because I strongly 
suspect that those new contours make no 
sense even as a policy matter, I concur 
only in the judgment of the Court. 
Justice BLACKMUN, with whom Justice 
MARSHALL joins, dissenting. 
It seems to me that we are concerned in 
this case not with "the complexity of the 
tax laws," ante, at 609, but with the 
income tax law in its most elementary and 
basic aspect: Is a wage earner a taxpayer 
and are wages income? 
The Court acknowledges that the 
conclusively established standard for 
willfulness under the applicable statutes is 
the " Voluntary, **615 intentional 
violation of a known legal duty.1" Ante, at 
610. See United States v. Bishop. 412 U.S. 
346.360,93 S.Ct. 2008.2017.36 L.Ed.2d 
941 (1973V and United States v. 
Pomponio. 429 U.S. 10. 12. 97 S.Ct. 22. 
23.50L.Ed.2dl2n976V That being so, 
it is incomprehensible to me how, in this 
day, more than 70 years after the 
institution of our *210 present federal 
income tax system with the passage of the 
Income Tax Act of 1913,3 8 Stat. 166, any 
taxpayer of competent mentality can assert 
as his defense to charges of statutory 
willfulness the proposition that the wage 
he receives for his labor is not income, 
irrespective of a cult that says otherwise 
and advises the gullible to resist income 
tax collections. One might note in passing 
that this particular taxpayer, after all, was 
a licensed pilot for one of our major 
commercial airlines; he presumably was a 
person of at least minimum intellectual 
competence. 
The District Court's instruction that an 
objectively reasonable and good-faith 
misunderstanding of the law negates 
willfulness lends further, rather than less, 
protection to this defendant, for it adds an 
additional hurdle for the prosecution to 
overcome. Petitioner should be grateful 
for this further protection, rather than be 
opposed to it. 
This Court's opinion today, I fear, will 
encourage taxpayers to cling to frivolous 
views of the law in the hope of convincing 
a jury of their sincerity. If that ensues, I 
suspect we have gone beyond the limits of 
common sense. 
While I may not agree with every word 
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the Court of Appeals has enunciated in its 
opinion, I would affirm its judgment in 
this case. I therefore dissent. 
END OF DOCUMENT 
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ADDENDUM E 
JURY INSTRUCTION 
Turning now to the third element of this offense You are instructed that the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant's failure to make a return was 
willful Willfulness vs the voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty 
This means that before you can convict the defendant of willful failure to file a 1995 state 
tax return and evasion of a tax the state prove beyond a reasonable doubt that failure to 
make a return was willful 
The defendant's failure to make a return was willful if the law imposed a duty on 
defendant to file a return he knew of this duty, and he voluntarily and intentionally 
violated that duty 
The defendant's conduct was not willful if he acted through negligence, inadvertence, 
mistake, or due to a good faith misunderstanding of the law If the defendant had a 
subjective good faith belief, no matter how unreasonable, that the law did not require him 
to file tax returns, he did not act willfully However, if the defendant failed to make a return 
either because he disagreed with the tax laws or he thought the tax laws to be 
unconstitutional, these beliefs would not amount to a good faith misunderstanding of the 
law so as to excuse his failure to make tax returns 
The defendant's state of mind is something that you, the jury, must determine And there 
is no way that the defendant's state of mind can be proved directly, because no one can 
read another person's mind and tell what that person is thinking But the defendant's state 
of mind can be proved indirectly from the surrounding circumstances This includes things 
like what the defendant said, what the defendant did, how the defendant acted, and any 
other facts or circumstances in evidence that show what was in the defendant's mind 
The defendant acted willfully if he deliberately intended not to make his tax returns which 
he knew ought to have been filed For the charge of willful failure to file tax returns for 
1995 the government is not required to prove that the defendant had any intention to 
defraud the government or to evade the payment of taxes The government must prove 
only that it was the defendant's deliberate intention not to make tax returns which he knew 
he was required to file, at the time that he was required by law to file them 
The defendant acted willfully if he deliberately intended to defraud the government or to 
evade the payment of taxes For the charge of evading the payment of taxes for 1995 the 
government is required to prove that the defendant intended to defraud the government 
or to evade the payment of taxes The government therefore, must prove that it was the 
defendant's deliberate intention to defraud the government or to evade the payment of 
taxes 
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1
 I MR. FUJINO: Judge, it's 5:00 o'clock, what's 
2
 the Court's inclination? The only other matter I—I 
° • wanted to address before the jury came in was the jury 
* instructions. 
5
 I We agreed on all of them except for, I think, 
the back two and we want to address that. 
7
 I THE COURT: Okay. Let's do that right now. 
8
 MR. FUJINO: But what do you want to do with 
9
 I the jury, Judge? 
THE COURT: Well, I think we may have to ask 
the jurors, but they may want to just go through it and 
6 
10 
11 
12 finish it up today. 
13 MR. FUJINO: Okay. 
14
 I MR. SMITH: What are we going to do about the 
15 I willfulness? We've got cases, copies of the Cheeks case 
16 and we need to determine what we're going to do with the 
17 willfulness issue also. As that was—that was a—a 
"•8 motion that we were going—an instruction we were going 
19 to hold in abeyance until we got— 
20 THE COURT: Is that what he's going to argue 
21 right now— 
22 MR. SMITH: Right. Oh. 
23 THE COURT: —the instructions? 
24 MR. SMITH: Okay. 
25 MR. FUJINO: And Judge, this is the Cheeks 
194 
6 
10 
11 
' case, Counsel has also been provided with it. 
* Essentially, the instruction I'm thinking about 
* is, we were in chambers before talking about ignorance of 
4
 the law is not a defense unless A, B and C. I think it 
5 I may be the very back instruction or the second-to-last 
instruction. 
7
 And what Cheeks indicates is it doesn't matter 
8
 if there's a—a grounded—well, let me get the language, 
9 I whether or not misunderstanding is objectively 
reasonable. And in this case,— 
THE COURT: Is that 35 you're looking at or is 
12
 I that--oh, 36? 
13 MR. FUJINO: I think (inaudible) Yes. 
14
 I Instruction No. 36 is the proposed instruction. 
We're asking the Court to strike that simply 
because Cheeks does not require that and as I understand 
17
 I Mr. Smith's argument, it doesn't matter whether or not 
18 his law, his authority was legally, objectively— 
19 objectively reasonable or not, it's just simply his 
20 intent. And we would ask the Court to strike on that 
21 basis. 
22 THE COURT: Okay. 
23 MR. BAER: Well, Judge, and of course, the way 
24 this trial has evolved and any time the Cheeks case, but 
25 we're talking about the—you know, the—are we talking 
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about the—which instruction are we talking about? 
THE COURT: 36. 
MR. FUJINO: 36. 
MR. BAER: And how does that read? 
MR. FUJINO: It—it's the statute. 
6
 I MR. BAER: The statute, well, let's—that's 
7 what I thought, your Honor, and that goes as to—I don't 
8 think that Cheeks abrogates that. I—I haven't heard any 
9
 I language to the effect that that is somehow—that—that 
that somehow denies the viability or the legal basis of 
the Utah state statute. 
12 Cheeks, in any event, the Seventh Circuit—I 
13 think it's dubious at best to take a Seventh Circuit case 
1 4
 and somehow say that that, you know, invalidates the Utah 
15 state statute on the books. I—it seems a bit far flung 
16 to the State. 
17 But it—was it an appeal to the Supreme Court? 
18 MR. FUJINO: Which was? 
19 MR. BAER: The Cheeks? 
20 MR. SMITH: Yes. It was a Supreme Court 
21 decision. 
22 MR. BAER: Supreme Court decision? 
23 I MS. MACANAS: No. 
24 
25 I MR. SMITH: Yes. 
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1
 • MS. MACANAS: Cheeks was, 
2
 I MR. BAER: I t i s ? 
3
 • MR. SMITH: Yeah. 
MR. BAER: Cheeks. 4 
10 
11 
12 
5
 I MS. MACANAS: But, y e a h — 
6
 I MR. BAER: Oh. Okay. Well, it i s — i t is, I'm 
7
 sorry, certiorari to the United States Supreme Court that 
3
 went from the Seventh. 
9 I The holding of Cheeks, as I have seen it before 
and I'm reading this from my note, apparently I had these 
notes and let me just peruse it for just a moment, your 
Honor. 
1 3
 The notes I have are as follows and I guess at 
1 4
 this moment, it'll have to stand as my understanding of 
1 5
 the case, I haven't reviewed it recently; but my notes 
1 6
 reflect this: In a prosecution for willfully attempting 
1 7
 to evade Federal income taxes and willfully failing to 
18 file Federal income taxes, there is no requirement that 
19 the defendant's good faith belief must be objectively 
20 reasonable. And I don't think we've been arguing about 
21 objectively versus subjectively, if the claimed belief is 
22 to be considered possibly negating the Federal 
23 Government's evidence purporting to show defendant's 
24 awareness of a legal duty at issue. 
25 They're talking about a federal g o v e r n m e n t ' s — 
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the federal government but—and it's been melded enough 
* in this trial, I grant that. A defendant's view about 
° the validity of State—of tax statutes are irrelevant to 
4
 the issue of willfulness and may not be heard by the jury 
M in a prosecution for willfulness, in quotes, attempting 
® to evade income taxes and willfully failing to file 
7 income tax returns. 
8 For these purposes, it makes no difference 
9 J whether the claims of invalid—invalidity are frivolous 
or have substance. And that seems to support the State's 
position, not to mention the statute, so we have a 
different understanding of that case law and I still 
don't see how it would negate a standing Utah state 
14
 statute. It talks about—talks about maybe related 
15 issues but not—not precisely on—on this point. 
16 And without reading further, I don't know how 
17 much of the facts are—are the same in that case. 
18 MR. FUJINO: Judge, the only thing I wanted to 
19 add was, in terms of the objectable—objectively 
20 reasonable standard. If you have the requirement 
21 pursuant to statute that he—it's only reasonable if he 
22 relies on the judgment of an administrative law judge or 
23 i can't remember the other provision of the statute, 
24 that's objectively reasonable, that's the basis or the 
25 standard through which the jurors are going to be guided. 
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1
 That's not required by Cheeks, it's not—it#s not 
2
 pursuant to somebody's lawful authority, it's not 
3 pursuant to a correct interpretation; in fact, this 
4
 language from Cheeks, who is even broader, says no matter 
5 how unreasonable—let me find the exact language. 
6
 Well, I—I can't find it. I think it's on the 
7 Court's copy. But it says something to the effect that 
8 no matter how incredible such misunderstandings and 
9
 beliefs are about the law may be. And that's what we 
10
 I have to—I mean, his beliefs may or may not be credible, 
his beliefs may or may not be logical, but that doesn't 
matter. It—It certainly should not be pursuant to the 
13
 lawful authority of an administrative law judge or 
14
 whatever else that statute says. 
15 MR. SMITH: Your Honor, based on Cheek, every 
16
 Federal district in the United States has adopted a 
17 willfulness jury instruction similar to the one that I 
18 first proposed. 
19 In the front end of Cheek, if you go to Page 
20 192, it says held, starting at Paragraph 1. A good faith 
21 misunderstanding of the law or a good faith belief that 
22 one is not violating the law negates willfulness whether 
23 or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is 
24 objectively reasonable. 
25 Statutory willfulness which— 
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MS. MACANAS: Could we just know where you're 
reading from? 
MR. SMITH: I'm reading on Page 192 starting 
with Paragraph 1. 
MS. MACANAS: Thank you. 
MR. SMITH: Are you with me? 
MS. MACANAS: Where were you starting on Page 
1? 
MR. SMITH: Starting with—with No. 1. 
MS. MACANAS: Thank you. 
MR. SMITH: Should I start over? 
THE COURT: No. 
MS. MACANAS: Please. 
MR. BAER: Well, Judge, I would object. Those 
are the headnotes, it's not the case. He's reading from 
the headnotes of the case. It's fairly axiomatic that 
the headnotes of a case are not the case holding 
necessarily. It's a summary. 
MR. SMITH: Hang on just a minute. We'll find 
it in the case then (inaudible) 
THE COURT: You know, if the jurors need to 
make telephone calls, Mr. Marks, that they may be held 
over, to call home that they're not going to be home, why 
don't 
While 
you make 
they're 
—have them 
arguing. 
make 
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the phone calls right now 
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1
 UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: It's going to be at 
2
 least a couple hours, your Honor, right? 
3
 THE COURT: Yeah. Just in case. 
^ (Inaudible discussion) 
5
 MR. BAER: Judge, I will point to Page 192. 
" It#s talking about objective reasonable. We're not 
^ arguing objective versus subjective reasonable. That's 
® (inaudible) disagree with the court of appeals 
9 J requirement, a claimed good faith belief must be 
objectively reasonable if considered as possibly negating 
11 the government's evidence purporting to show the 
12 defendant's aware of a legal duty, which we're not 
13 arguing objectiveness versus subjectiveness. (Inaudible) 
14 MR. FUJINO: And Judge, if that's not the 
15 argument, then that statute or that jury instruction has 
16 no application. 
17 MR. BAER: Well, if that's their new argument 
18 your Honor, we could address that, but that hasn't been 
19 raised to this point. 
20 MR. SMITH: The only issue I'm raising in 
21 addition to what Mr. Fujino is raising is that I believe 
22 I'm entitled to an instruction which defines intent and 
23 instructs the jury that according to the instruction 
24 (inaudible) proposed on willfulness that (inaudible) 
25 THE COURT: Let's see. Do you have a copy of 
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2 
3 
4 
10 
the one that you proposed? I don't have it here, 
MR* BAER: Judge, I'd also draw your attention 
to language further on down Page 192, that says it is not 
contrary to common sense—just down Page—I'm sorry, I'm 
* sorry, it's Page 203. Where it's, we disagree 
* (inaudible) it says as follows, it is not contrary to 
' common sense let alone possible for a defendant to be 
8 (inaudible) based on an irrational belief that he has no 
9 I duty. Forbidding his jury to consider evidence that 
might negate willfulness would raise a serious question 
11
 of the (inaudible) jury trial provision. 
12 We're not asking that the jury be forbidden to 
13 consider this evidence. If you want to fashion a jury 
14 instruction that specifically instructs themi to—that 
15 they may consider evidence that might negate willfulness, 
16 the State would wholly support it, if something doesn't 
17 already exist in that language in the draft so far. 
18 May I approach? 
19 THE COURT: Let's see, do you have a copy of 
20 the defendant's willful versus voluntary, intentional 
21 violation of known legal duty? 
22 MR. BAER: Judge, if I could draw your 
23 attention to (inaudible) supports the State's position. 
24 in this case, on Page 203, it says as follows: It was 
25 therefore error to instruct the jury to disregard— 
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1
 disregard evidence of the defendant's, and I'm saying the 
^ defendant was Cheeks— 
3
 THE COURT: Where are you at now? 
4
 MR, BAER: Page 203. 
5
 THE COURT: The bottom part? 
6
 MR. BAER: Bottom part where it says, It was 
7 therefore. 
8 THE COURT: Okay. 
9 MR. BAER: I read to you from up above where it 
10 says it would be proper to exclude evidence having no 
11 relevance or probative value with respect to the 
12 contrary, let alone impossible for defendant to be 
13 ignorant of his duty based on an irrational belief. I 
14 don't think we're there. 
15 if you look down, it's—it was therefore error 
16 to instruct the jury to disregard evidence of Cheeks' 
17 understanding that within the meaning of the tax laws, he 
18 was not a person required to file a return or pay income 
19 taxes and that wages are not taxable income as incredible 
20 as such misunderstandings or beliefs about the law might 
21 be. 
22 We're not asking that in this case# your Honor. 
23 That is not happening in this case. Of course, the more 
24 unreasonable the asserted beliefs or misunderstandings, 
25 the more likely the jury will consider them to be nothing 
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10 
11 
more than simple disagreement with known legal duties 
2
 imposed by tax laws and we'll find the government has 
3
 I carried its burden. That's all we're asking in this 
case. 
5 Cheek asserted in the trial court that he 
® should be acquitted because he believed in good faith 
7 that the income tax law is unconstitutional as applied to 
8 him and thus could not be—legally impose any duty upon 
9 I him of which he should have been aware. Sounds similar 
to the testimony we heard, not identical but similar. 
Such submission is unsound, not because Cheeks' 
12 unconstitutional arguments are not objectively reasonable 
13 or frivolous, which they surely are# but because the 
14 Murdock Pomp (inaudible) line of cases does not support 
15 such a proposition. Those cases construed the 
16 willfulness requirement in the criminal provision of the 
17 internal Revenue Code to require proof of knowledge of 
18 the law. 
19 This was because and they quote, our complex 
20 tax system uncertainty often arises even among taxpayers 
21 who earnestly wish to follow the law and it is not the 
22 purpose of the law to penalize frank differences of 
23 opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of 
24 reasonable care. 
25 If you wish to insert an instruction to that 
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 effect, the State has no objections. It is not the 
2
 purpose of the law to penalize frank differences of 
3
 opinion or innocent errors made despite the exercise of 
4
 I reasonable care. The State would have no objection to 
that. 
6 The case goes on: Claims that some of the 
7
 provisions of the tax code are unconstitutional are 
8 submissions of a totally different order. They do not 
9 I arise from innocent mistakes caused by the complexity of 
the Internal Revenue Code; rather, they reveal full 
knowledge of the provisions at issue and a studied 
10 
11 
12
 J conclusion, however wrong that those provisions are 
13 I invalid and unenforceable; thus, in this case, Cheek paid 
14
 his taxes for years, but after attending various seminars 
15 and based upon his own study, he concluded the income tax 
16 laws could not constitutionally require him to pay a tax, 
17
 Sounds remarkably similar, your Honor. 
18 We do not believe that congress contemplated 
19 such a taxpayer, without risking criminal prosecution, 
20 could ignore the duties imposed upon him by the Internal 
21 Revenue Code and refuse to utilize the mechanisms 
22 provided by congress to present his claims of invalidity 
23 to the courts and to abide by their decision. 
24 There is no doubt that Cheek from year to year 
25 was free to pay the tax that the law purported to 
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1
 require, file for refund and if denied, present his 
claims of invalidity, constitutional or otherwise, to the 
I courts. And it cites a United States Code section, as 
you can see. 
5 Also, without paying the tax, he could have 
* challenged the claims of deficiencies in the tax court. 
M We've heard evidence that it didn't appear, that's with 
8 the State Tax Court, of course, with a right to appeal to 
9 J a higher court if necessary—if unsuccessful. I'm sorry. 
Cheek took neither courses for some years and 
when he did, was unwilling to accept the outcome. As we 
see, he is in no position to claim that his good faith 
belief about the validity of the Internal Revenue Code 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 I negates willfulness or provides a defense to criminal 
15
 I prosecution under the Sections 7-201 and 7-203 
16 of course, Cheek was free in this very case to 
17
 present his claims of invalidity, as has been done in 
18 this case, your Honor, and had been adjudicated; but like 
19 defendants in criminal cases in other contexts who, 
20 guote, "willfully", close quote, refuse to comply with 
21 the duties placed upon them by law, he must take the risk 
22 of being wrong. 
23 And here's the holding: We thus hold that in a 
24 case like this, a defendant's views about the validity of 
25 a tax statute are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness. 
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Perhaps we should have an instruction to that effect, 
please, and need not be heard by the jury and if they 
are, an instruction to disregard them would be proper. 
The State would move for such an instruction. 
For this purpose, it makes no difference 
whether the claim of invalidity are—are frivolous or 
have substance. It was therefore not error in this case 
for the district court to instruct the jury not to 
consider Cheek's claim that the tax laws were 
unconstitutional; however, it was error for them to 
instruct the jury that petitioner's asserted beliefs that 
wages are not income and that he was not a taxpayer 
within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code should 
not be considered by the jury in determining whether 
Cheek had acted willfully. 
I know of no such instructions in our list and 
I still am at a loss to see how that reverts back to the 
State statute. I would renew the motion for additional 
instructions that indicate that under United States law, 
a defendant's views about the validity of the tax 
divisions are irrelevant to the issue of willfulness and 
need not be heard by you, the members of the jury, and if 
they are—well, then you don't need—they are an 
instruction to disregard, that is an instruction and 
should be—and should be disregarded. We would 
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appreciate under this very holding that inserted 
instruction. 
MR. FUJINO: Judge, I need to respond briefly. 
What's stated here in Cheeks is obviously different from 
the context of the other constitutional arguments and the 
arguments that may have been presented in Cheeks and it 
still does not preclude the arguments that we've stated; 
in fact# it's still consistent with the arguments. That 
jury instruction, No. 36, I believe# should be 
eliminated. 
Keep in mind, they're—they're differentiating 
the differences in the instructions. One concerns that 
wages are not income, that he was not a taxpayer. And 
the trial court there instructed the jury that—something 
about it has to be based on objective reasonableness. 
And that's still our argument there. 
The Supreme Court instructed the lower courts 
that that was error to do so on that basis. This other 
argument is different from—from the objective 
reasonableness determination that we've been talking 
about. 
MR. BAER: Judge, I may have missed one point. 
We're not figuring in any fashion, regardless of what you 
do with the instruction that's included in that and been 
agreed to previously—well, the subject (inaudible) that 
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it's going to in fact be substituted for some other 
instruction (inaudible) so that's clear. 
And again, we would renew our motion to have an 
instruction that comports with the language directly out 
of Cheek. 
THE COURT: Just listening to each of your 
arguments and reading the Instruction No. 36, the Court 
is of the opinion that Instruction No. 36 should remain 
and defendant's motion is denied at this time. And 
State's motion to add the additional motion is denied 
also at this time. 
MR. FUJINO: Janise, were there any other 
instructions? 
MS. MACANAS: We can take a look at them 
(inaudible) 
THE COURT: Is that yours? 
MR. BAER: We—I don't believe we've agreed to 
No. 35. 
THE COURT: Is there anything else? 
MR. BAER: No. 35, Judge. 
THE COURT: No. 35. 
MR. BAER: I don't believe we've agreed to 
that. I don't know of any authority on it. 
MR. SMITH: I believe we did agree to that one 
and you put it in your file. 
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ADDENDUM G 
FILED DISTRICT COUBT 
Third Judicial District 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
IN AMD FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE* 
THE STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff, : INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY 
VS. : CRIMINAL NO. 991920225 
THOMAS H. SMITH, : 
Defendant . 
INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
You are instructed that the defendant THOMAS H. SMITH is 
charged by the Amended Information which has been duly filed with 
t h e c o m m i s s i o n Of TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX 
RETURN and TAX EVASION-WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX. The 
Information a l l e g e s : 
COUNT I 
TAX EVASION - FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN, a Third 
Degree Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before 
April 15, 1996 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 
1101(1) (b), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that THOMAS 
SMITH, with an intent to evade any tax or requirement of Title 59 
or any lawful requirement of the State Tax Commission, failed to 
make, render, sign, or verify any return or to supply any 
information within the time required under this title, or did make, 
render, sign, verify any false or fraudulent return or statement, 
or supplied false or fraudulent information; for tax year 1995. 
COUNT II 
TAX EVASION - WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second Degree 
Felony, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, on or before April 15, 
1996 in violation of Title 76, Chapter 8, Section 1101(1) (c), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, in that THOMAS H. SMITH, 
willfully attempted to evade or defeat a tax or the payment thereof 
due on his income earned in 1995. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2 
Instruction No. 1 is not to be considered by you as a 
statement of the facts proved in this case, but is to be regarded 
by you merely as a summarized statement of the allegations of the 
Amended Information. The mere fact that the defendant stands 
charged with an offense is not to be taken by you as any evidence 
of his guilt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
You are instructed that to the Amended Information the 
defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not guilty 
denies each of the essential allegations of the charge contained in 
the Information and casts upon the State the burden of proving each 
and all of the essential allegations thereof to your satisfaction 
and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
You are instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has 
been charged with an offense and has been held to answer to the 
charge by a committing magistrate is not any evidence of his guilt 
and is not even a circumstance which should be considered by you in 
determining his guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5~ 
I t becomes my duty as judge to i n s t r u c t you c o n c e r n i n g the 
law a p p l i c a b l e to t h i s case , and i t i s your d u t y as j u r o r s to 
f o l l o w the law as I s h a l l s t a t e i t to you. 
The f u n c t i o n of the j u r y i s to t r y the i s s u e s of f a c t t h a t 
a r e p r e s e n t e d by t h e a l l e g a t i o n s in the I n f o r m a t i o n f i l e d in t h i s 
c o u r t and the d e f e n d a n t ' s p l e a of "not g u i l t y ' 1 . T h i s duty you 
s h o u l d per form u n i n f l u e n c e d by p i t y for the d e f e n d a n t o r by p a s s i o 
o r p r e j u d i c e a g a i n s t him. You must not s u f f e r y o u r s e l v e s to be 
b i a s e d a g a i n s t t h e defendant because of the f a c t t h a t he has been 
a r r e s t e d for t h i s o f f e n s e , or because an I n f o r m a t i o n has been f i l e 
a g a i n s t him, o r because he has been b rough t b e f o r e t h e c o u r t to 
s t a n d t r i a l . None of these f a c t s i s e v i d e n c e of h i s g u i l t , and yet 
a r e n o t p e r m i t t e d to i n f e r or to s p e c u l a t e from any o r a l l of them 
t h a t he i s more l i k e l y to be g u i l t y than i n n o c e n t . 
You a r e to be governed s o l e l y by the e v i d e n c e i n t r o d u c e d i n 
t h i s t r i a l and t h e law as s t a t e d to you by me. The law f o r b i d s 
you to be gove rned by mere s e n t i m e n t , c o n j e c t u r e , sympathy , pa s s io r . 
p r e j u d i c e , p u b l i c o p i n i o n or p u b l i c f e e l i n g . Both t h e S t a t e of 
Utah and the d e f e n d a n t have a r i g h t to demand and t h e y do demand and 
e x p e c t t h a t you w i l l c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y and d i s p a s s i o n a t e l y c o n s i d e r 
and weigh the e v i d e n c e and apply the law of t h e c a s e , cha t you w i l l 
r e a c h a j u s t v e r d i c t r e g a r d l e s s of what the c o n s e q u e n c e s of such 
v e r d i c t may b e . The v e r d i c t must express t he i n d i v i d u a l o p i n i o n 
of each j u r o r . 
INSTRUCTION NO. (^  
At times throughout the trial the court has been called 
upon to determine whether certain offered evidence might pro-
perly be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons 
for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. 
Whether offered evidence is admissible is purely a question 
of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, 
the court does not determine what weight should be given such 
evidence; nor does it pass on the credibility of the witness. 
You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor 
any evidence stricken out by the court; as to any question to 
which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to 
what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the 
objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ' J 
All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in 
favor of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until he 
is proved guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. And in case of a 
reasonable doubt as to whether his guilt is satisfactorily shown, 
he is entitled to an acquittal. 
I have heretofore told you that the burden is upon the State 
to prove the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt does not require proof to an absolute 
certainty. Now by reasonable doubt is meant a doubt that is 
based on reason and one which is reasonable in view of all the 
evidence. It must be a reasonable doubt and not a doubt which is 
merely fanciful or imaginary or based on a wholly speculative 
possibility. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is that degree of 
proof which satisfies the mind, convinces the understanding of 
those who are bound to act conscientiously upon it and obviates 
all reasonable doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt which 
reasonable men and women would entertain, and it must arise from 
the evidence or the lack of the evidence in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ _ 
Where t h e r e i s a c o n f l i c t in the evidence you shou ld 
r e c o n c i l e such c o n f l i c t as fa r as you reasonably can . But 
where the c o n f l i c t canno t be r econc i l ed , you a re the f i n a l 
j u d g e s and must d e t e r m i n e from the evidence what t h e f a c t s 
a r e . There a r e no d e f i n i t e ru l e s governing how you s h a l l 
d e t e r m i n e t he weight o r convincing force of any e v i d e n c e , o r 
how you s h a l l de te rmine what the f ac t s in t h i s c a s e a r e . But 
you should c a r e f u l l y and c o n s c i e n t i o u s l y cons ide r and compare 
a l l of the t e s t imony , and a l l of the f ac t s and c i r c u m s t a n c e s , 
which have a bea r ing on any i s s u e , and determine t h e r e f r o m 
what the f a c t s a r e . You a r e not bound to b e l i e v e a l l t h a t 
t h e w i t n e s s e s have t e s t i f i e d to or any wi tness o r c l a s s of 
w i t n e s s e s u n l e s s such t e s t imony i s r easonab le and c o n v i n c i n g 
i n view of a l l of the f a c t s and c i rcumstances in e v i d e n c e . 
You may b e l i e v e one w i t n e s s as aga ins t many, or many as a g a i n s t 
a fewer number in a c c o r d a n c e with your honest c o n v i c t i o n s . The 
t e s t i m o n y of a w i t n e s s known to have made f a l s e s t a t e m e n t s on 
one m a t t e r i s n a t u r a l l y l e s s convincing on o the r m a t t e r s . So 
i f you b e l i e v e a w i t n e s s has w i l f u l l y t e s t i f i e d f a l s e l y as t o 
any m a t e r i a l f a c t in t h i s c a s e , you may d i s r e g a r d the whole o f 
t h e t e s t imony of such w i t n e s s , or you may g ive i t such w e i g h t 
a s you t h i n k i t i s e n t i t l e d t o . 
INSTRUCTION NO. ~\ 
You are the exclus ive judges of the c r e d i b i l i t y of the 
wi tnesses and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight 
of the test imony and c r e d i b i l i t y of the witnesses you have a 
r i g h t to take in to cons idera t ion t he i r b i a s , t h e i r i n t e r e s t in 
the r e s u l t of the s u i t , or any probable motive or lack thereof 
to t e s t i f y f a i r l y , i f any i s shown. You may consider the w i t -
n e s s e s 1 deportment upon the witness stand, the reasonableness of 
t h e i r s t a t emen t s , t h e i r apparent frankness or candor, or the want 
of i t , t h e i r oppor tuni ty to know, t he i r a b i l i t y to unders tand, 
and t h e i r capac i ty to remember. You should consider these ma t t e r s 
t oge the r wi th a l l of the other facts and circumstances which you 
may be l i eve have a bear ing on the t ru thfulness or accuracy of the 
wi tnes ses f s t a tement . 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ Q 
You are instructed that the defendant is a competent 
witness in his own behalf and his testimony should be re-
ceived and given the same consideration as you give to that 
of any other witness. The fact that he stands accused of a 
crime is no evidence of his guilt and is no reason for reject-
ing his testimony. However, you should weigh his testimony 
the same as you weigh the testimony of any other witness. 
INSTRUCTION NO. U 
In determining any fact in this case you should not 
consider nor be influenced by any statement made or act done 
by the court which you may interpret as indicating its views 
thereon. You are the sole and final judges of all questions 
of fact submitted to you, and you must determine such questions 
for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you 
believe the court thinks thereon. The court has not intended 
to express, or intimate, or be understood as giving any opin-
ion on what the proof shows or does not show, or what are or 
what are not the facts in the case. And it is immaterial what 
the court thinks thereon. You must follow your own views and 
not be influenced by the views of the court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ 1 
The State of Utah and the defendant both are e n t i t l e d 
to the ind iv idua l opinion of each ju ror . I t i s the duty of 
each of you a f te r considering a l l the evidence in the case, to 
de termine , i f pos s ib l e , the quest ion of gu i l t or innocence of 
the defendant . When you have reached a conclusion in tha t r e -
spec t , you should not change i t merely because one or more or 
a l l of your fellow j u r o r s may have come to a d i f ferent con-
c l u s i o n . However, each ju ro r should freely and f a i r l y d iscuss 
with h i s fellow j u r o r s the evidence and the deduction to be 
drawn therefrom. If, a f t e r doing so, any ju ror should be s a t -
i s f i e d t h a t a conclusion f i r s t reached by him was wrong, he 
u n h e s i t a t i n g l y should abandon tha t or ig inal opinion and render 
h i s v e r d i c t according to his f i n a l decision. 
INSTRUCTION NO. • ± 
I f in these i n s t r u c t i o n s any r u l e , d i r e c t i o n or i d e a 
h a s been s t a t e d in va ry ing ways, no emphasis thereon i s i n -
t e n d e d , and none must be i n f e r r e d by you. For t h a t r e a s o n , 
you a r e no t to s i n g l e ou t any c e r t a i n s en t ence , or any i n d i v i d u a l 
p o i n t or i n s t r u c t i o n , and i g n o r e the o t h e r s , but you a re to c o n -
s i d e r a l l the i n s t r u c t i o n s a s a whole, and to regard each i n t h e 
l i g h t of a l l the o t h e r s . 
The o r d e r in which t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s a r e given has no 
s i g n i f i c a n c e as to t h e i r r e l a t i v e importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ^ 
The attitude and conduct of jurors at the outset of 
their deliberations are a matter of considerable importance. 
It is rarely productive of good for a juror, upon entering 
the jury room, to make an emphatic expression of his opinion 
on the case or to announce a determination to stand for a 
certain verdict. When one does that at the outset, his sense 
of pride nay be aroused, and he may hesitate to recede from 
an announced position if shown that it is fallacious. Remember 
that you are not partisans or advocates in this matter, but are 
judges. The final test of the quality of your service will lie 
in the verdict which you return to the court, not in the opin-
ions any of you may hold as you retire. Have in mind that you 
will make a definite contribution to efficient judicial admin-
istration if you arrive at a just and proper verdict. To that 
end, the court would remind you that in your deliberations in 
the jury rocn there can be no triumph excepting the ascertainment 
and declaration of the truth and the administation of justice 
based therecn. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \^> 
The court has endeavored to give you instructions em-
bodying all rules of law that may become necessary in guiding 
you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some of 
these instructions will depend upon the conclusions you reach 
as to what the facts are. As to any such instruction, the 
fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an 
opinion of the court and that the instruction will be necessary 
or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts which you find does not exist, you will disre-
gard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO . \ IP 
Two classes of evidence are recognized and admitted in 
courts of justice, upon either or both of which, juries law-
fully may base their findings, whether favorable to the State 
or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a ver-
dict of guilt the evidence, whether of one kind or the other 
or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality re-
quired by law. 
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other 
as circumstantial. The law makes no distinction between the two 
classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as 
to their effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each 
for such convincing force as it may carry and accepts each as a 
reasonable method of proof. 
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with 
any of his own physical senses, perceived such conduct or any 
part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what 
thus was perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is 
circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, insofar as it 
shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance 
of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence 
or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriv-
ing at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \ H 
Taxable year means the time period January 1, 1995, up to and 
including December 31, 1995. 
INSTRUCTION NO. \¥ 
A Utah Resident is defined as an individual who: 
(a) is domiciled for the entire year in Utah even though temporarily outside of Utah; or, 
(b) an individual who is domiciled in this state for any period of time during the taxable year, but 
only for the duration of such period; or, 
(b) even though living outside Utah, maintains a permanent place of abode within the state and 
spends a total of 183 days or more of the taxable year within Utah. 
INSTRUCTION MO, \°V 
Under Title 59 of the Utah Code, "taxpayer11 means any 
individual, estate, or trust or beneficiary of an estate or trust, 
whose income is subject in whole or part to the tax imposed by 
this, Individual Income Tax Act, chapter. 
INSTRUCTION NO._J£0 
Under Title 59. "taxable income" and "state taxable income" for resident individuals are 
fined as provided in Sections 59-10-111 and 59-10-112. 
Under 59-10-111, "Federal taxable income" means taxable income as currently defined in 
:tion 63, Internal Revenue Code of 1986. 
Under 59-10-112, "State taxable income" in the case of a resident individual means his 
eral taxable income (as defined by Section 59-10-111) with any applicable modifications, 
tractions, and adjustments. 
INSTRUCTION MO. 
Sec. 61. Gross income defined 
(a) General definition 
Except as otherwise provided in this subtitle, gross 
income means all income from whatever source derived, 
including (but not limited to) the following items: 
(1) Compensation for services, including fees, 
commissions, fringe benefits, and similar items; 
(2) Gross income derived from business; 
(3) Gains derived from dealings in property; 
(4) Interest; 
(5) Rents; 
(6) Royalties; 
(7) Dividends; 
(8) Alimony and separate maintenance payments; 
(9) Annuities; 
(10) Income from l i f e insurance and endowment c o n t r a c t s ; 
(11) Pensions; 
(12) Income from discharge of indebtedness; 
(13) Distributive share of partnership gross income; 
(14) Income in respect of a decedent; and 
(15) Income from an interest in an estate or trust. 
INSTRUCTION NO, g Q 
In U.S. Code, Sec. 63. Taxable income is defined as: 
(a) In general 
Except as provided in subsection (b) , for purposes of 
this subtitle, the term "taxable income" means gross income minus 
the deductions allowed by this chapter (other than the standard 
deduction). 
(b) Individuals who do not itemize their deductions 
In the case of an individual who does not elect to 
itemize his deductions for the taxable year, for purposes of this 
subtitle, the term "taxable income11 means adjusted gross income, 
minus: 
(1) the standard deduction, and 
(2) the deduction for personal exemptions provided in 
section 151. 
INSTRUCTION HO. ^3> 
Federal Law at 26 CFR Sec. 1.861-8 states computation o 
taxable income from sources within the United States. The rules 
contained in this section apply in determining taxable income of 
the taxpayer from sources from within the United States. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
Federal law says for purposes of t h i s s e c t i o n , t h e term 
"exempt income" means any income that i s in whole or in part , 
exempt, excluded, or eliminated for federal income t a x purposes . 
INSTRUCTION NO._^C* 
Under Title 59, section 59-10-502 lists the persons required to file tax returns. That 
:tion states: An income tax return with respect to the tax imposed by this chapter shall be filed 
every resident individual, estate, or trust required to file a federal income tax return for the 
able year. 
INSTRUCTION MO, O"1 
Utah Code Ann., Section 59-10-102, entitled MDeclaration 
Intent,11 states as follows: 
The intent of the Legislature in the enactment of this 
chapter is to accomplish the following objectives: 
(1) to impose on each resident individual, estate, or 
trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount 
of his "taxable incomew for such year, as determined for 
federal income tax purposes, subject to certain 
adjustments; and 
(2) to impose on each nonresident individual, estate, or 
trust for each taxable year a tax measured by the amount 
allocable to this state of his "taxable income" for such 
year, as determined for federal income tax purposes, 
subject to certain adjustments; and 
(3) to adopt for Utah individual income tax purposes, by 
reference, the provisions of the federal income tax laws 
which are applicable in arriving at the amount of income 
subject to tax for federal income tax purposes which, it 
is believed, will: 
(a) promote consistency in tax treatment of 
persons required to file returns of income for 
both federal individual income tax and Utah 
individual income tax purposes; and 
(b) enable a taxpayer to prepare his required 
Utah income tax return for any taxable year 
with a minimum expenditure of additional time 
and effort after having prepared his federal 
income tax return for such year; 
(4) to conform, to the extent practicable, certain of the 
existing rules of procedure under and for the 
administration of the Utah individual income tax law to 
corresponding or apposite rules of administration and 
procedure prescribed by the federal income tax laws, with 
a view to reduction of duplication of effort, promotion 
of better understanding of requirements, and greater 
consistency between state and federal procedures and 
administration. 
INSTRUCTION NO. £ ^ 
Utah Code, Section 76-2-103, states: 
A person engages in conduct: 
(1) Intentionally, or with intent or willfully with 
respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of 
his conduct, when it is his conscious objective or desire 
to engage in the conduct or cause the result. 
(2) Knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to his 
conduct or to circumstances surrounding his conduct when 
he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with 
knowledge, with respect to a result of his conduct when 
he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to 
cause the result. 
(3) Recklessly, or maliciously, with respect to 
circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of 
his conduct when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the 
circumstances exist or the result will occur. The risk 
must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor1 s standpoint. 
(4) With criminal negligence or is criminally negligent 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or 
the result of his conduct when he ought to be aware of a 
substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances 
exist or the result will occur. The risk must be of such 
a nature and degree that the failure to perceive it 
constitutes a gross deviation from the standard of care 
that an ordinary person would exercise in all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
JURY INSTRUCTION ^ 
The defendant has introduced evidence of advice he heard given by speakers at 
meetings, tape recorded lectures, essays, pamphlets, court opinions, and other material 
that he testified he relied on in concluding that he was not a person required to file an 
income tax return for 1995. This evidence has been admitted solely for the purpose of 
aiding you in determining whether or not the defendant's failure to timely file a tax return 
for 1995 was knowing and willful and you should not consider it for any other purpose. 
You are not to consider this evidence as containing any law that you are to apply in 
reaching your verdicts, because all of the law applicable to this case is set forth in these 
instructions. 
INSTRUCTION NO. Mh 
You are instructed that the admission of defendant's 
Exhibit #23 A-W is not entered into evidence for any substantive 
value but for the limited purpose of showing the defendant's 
state of mind on or about January 1, 1995 to April 16, 1996. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J J p 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the Amended Information. Each 
charge and the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may 
find the defendant guilty or not guilty as to one of the charged offenses should not affect your 
verdict as to any other charged offense. 
I caution you, members of the jury, that you are here to determine from the evidence in 
this case whether the defendant is guilty or not guilty. The defendant is on trial only for those 
specific offenses alleged in the information. 
Also, the question of punishment should never be considered by the jury in any way in 
deciding the case. If the defendant is convicted the matter of punishment is for the judge to 
determine. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 J 
A separate crime is charged in each count. You must decide each count separately. Your 
verdict on one count should not control your verdict on any other count. Failure to Make, 
Render, Sign, or Verify a Proper Tax Return is a separate charge from Willful Evasion of Taxes. 
Each charge should be considered separately, even if they are for the same year. 
IHSTRUCTIOll MO, ^ 3 
Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax 
Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign or Verify a Tax Return, in 
Count I of the Amended Information, you must find from the evidence 
that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every 
one of the following elements: 
1. On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Thomas Smith; 
2. Intentionally or willfully evaded; 
3« Any applicable tax or requirement of Title 59; and that 
he 
4. Failed to make, render, sign, or verify any return or to 
supply any information within the time required, or he made, 
rendered, signed, or verified any false or fraudulent return of 
statement, or he supplied any false or fraudulent information. 
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Failure to Hake, Render, Sign 
or Verify a Tax Return, in Count I of the Amended Information, you 
must find the defendant not guilty. On the other hand, if the 
evidence establishes beyond a reasonable doubt all of the elements 
of Tax Evasion - Failure to Make, Render, Sign or Verify a Tax 
Return, you must find the defendant guilty of the offense. 
INSTRUCTION MO. 2 ^ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Thomas Smith, of Tax 
Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, in Count II of the Amended 
Information, you must find from the evidence that the State has 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one of the 
following elements: 
1. On or before April 15, 1996, in Salt Lake County, State 
of Utah, Thomas Smith; 
2. Intentionally or willfully attempted; 
3. To evade or defeat any applicable tax or requirement of 
Title 59 or the payment thereof due on his income earned in 1995. 
If the evidence fails to establish beyond a reasonable doubt 
all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful Evasion of Income Tax, 
in Count II of the Amended Information, you must find the defendant 
not guilty. On the other hand, if the evidence establishes beyond 
a reasonable doubt all of the elements of Tax Evasion - Willful 
Evasion of Income Tax, you must find the defendant guilty of the 
offense. 
INSTRUCTION MO . 3-fT 
When you retire to consider your verdict, you will select one 
of your members to act as foreperson, who, as foreperson, will 
preside over your deliberations. 
Your verdicts in this case must be either: 
Guilty of TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER TAX RETURN, 
a Third Degree Felony, as charged in Count I of the 
Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count I, TAX EVASION-FAILING TO RENDER A PROPER 
TAX RETURN, a Third Degree Felony; 
And/or 
Guilty of TAX EVAS ION-WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME TAX, a Second 
Degree Felony, as charged in Count II of the Information; 
or 
Not Guilty of Count II, TAX EVASION-WILLFUL EVASION OF INCOME 
TAX, a Second Degree Felony; 
as your deliberations may determine. 
This being a criminal case, a unanimous concurrence of all 
jurors is required to find a verdict. Your verdict must be in 
writing, and when found, must be signed and dated by your 
foreperson and then returned by you to this court. When your 
verdicts have been found, notify the bailiff that you are 
report to the court. 
Dated at Salt Lake City, Utah V / ^ 7 <- '' 
JUDG 
